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This study examines those endemic factors which
contribute to the entrenchment of the status quo in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. By removing the dynamics of the Cold
War, the particular circumstances of the main actors--
Israel, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Syria, the
United States and the United Nations--become apparent. It
is the thesis of this paper that the underlying causes in
the creation and perpetuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict
include (1) the importance of ideology and security to
Israel, (2) a lack of political will among the players to
alter the status quo, (3) a plethora of systemic
organizational constraints, and (4) limitations faced by the
UN that inhibit its usefulness as an intermediary. While
compelling arguments should move the actors toward a
resolution of the conflict, particularly when a window of
opportunity now exists in the aftermath of Desert Storm, the
factors cited above comprise powerful counterforces which
both serve to sustain Israel's de facto borders and provide
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Why aren't Arabs and Israelis seeking an end to their
conflict, particularly when there are compelling social,
economic and national security reasons for each side to do
so? Why do they continue in an uneasy state of war in which
neither side could possibly win? Why have the United States
and the United Nations been ineffective as intermediaries?
In seeking answers to those questions, this paper
addresses the factors which have contributed to the present
state of affairs. Historical antecedents and current
dynamics are used to illustrate the fact that there are
rational and equally compelling reasons which have
entrenched the region in the status quo, thus perpetuating
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
This research was conducted using Israel as the focal
point for Israel controls the territories in question and is
thus, integral to any solution based on a "land for peace"
formula. In this regard, the paper first examines the
millennium of ideology and security, which have shaped the
identity of the Jewish people in the past and which will
continue to guide the direction of Israelis into the next
century.
Zionist ideology not only transformed Europe's
subservient Ostjuden into the more militant pioneers who
vii
settled the Yishuv (pre-state Israel), it also created the
political movement which culminated with Israel's statehood.
Yet the twin pillars of Zionism and national security have
exacerbated Israel's relations with Arabs and Palestinians,
just as they have been strengthened when con~fronted with
hostile Arab rhetoric and behavior.
The dynamics of ideology and security have prompted
certain actions and reactions, but more passive factors have
played an equally important role. The first of these is a
lack of political will to change the status quo. Despite
the military costs of occupation, Israel derives
considerable economic and strategic benefits from the
territories and continues to enjoy normal trade and
diplomatic relations with the world at large. For Syria's
president Hafez al-Asad, the conflict may have, in fact,
enhanced his domestic and regional clout because he has been
able to exploit anti-Zionist sentiments.
The PLO has nct been able to present a viable political
force, being hampered by the geographic dispersion of
Palestinians, internal political fragmentation, and failure
of the intifada. Even the US has demonstrated only sporadic
and reactionary interest in Arab-Israeli affairs, since its
national security requirements in the region have been
satisfied through a careful balance of alliances.
Additionally, competing issues and problems, both in the US
viii
and abroad, have detracted from any sustained attention in
the Levant.
Organizational constraints add to the entrenchment of
the status quo. Israel's parliamentary system perpetuates
coalition politics, with little room for outside inputs,
innovation or change. Likewise, Israel's military is able
to defend the political decisions of its leaders and
maintain control of Israel's de facto borders. And the PLO
has been a weak counterforce, due to internal division and
lack of astute leadership. On the other hand, the political
power of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee has
strengthened American-Israeli ties and buttressed Israel's
position vis a vis the Arabs and Palestinians.
The United Nations has had limited effectiveness as an
intermediary in the Arab-Israeli conflict, hampered by the
veto power of members of the Security Council, and financial
dependency upon the US. The organization has also faced
juridical constraints as issues regarding national
sovereignty have been difficult to resolve. The
interpretation and legality of UN resolutions comprise
another area of contention, with opposing Arab and Israeli
viewpoints.
So the entrenchment of the status quo continues, despite
compelling arguments for increased national security,
regional stability and economic growth. The Arab-Israeli
ix
conflict drags on, even though a window of opportunity for
peace exists after the end of the Cold War and the unique
alliances that were formed during Desert Storm. Even as
the Mideast peace talks reach another stalemate, the forces
perpetuating the Arab-Israeli conflict may be producing the
most substantive results to date.
x
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I am indebted to the unwavering and untiring support of
my husband and editor, whose encouragement and knowledge of
writing composition and Wordperfect were essential in not
only the successful completion or this manuscript, bu', in
transforming it into a professional product. I would also
like to thank my professors and advisors, Dr. Ralph Magnus
and Dr. David Winterford, for their expertise and patience,
which resuited in the clarity and focus of my research and
accuracy of detail. Finally, Dr. Sadok Masliyah, chairman
of the Hebrew department at the Defense Language Institute
and Michelle Kolerstein, my ldnguage instructor, providei
the catalyst I needed to wrap up a hard year of labor and
deliver the goods forthwith.
xi
I. INTRODUCTION
It is in the minds of men that peace must be
constructed.
UNESCO Constitution
The Middle East peace talks are now completing their
second year of negotiations. But while hope yet remains for
a settlement with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it
is truly unfortunate that one of the most tangible achieve-
ments to date is still simply that the "Israelis and Arabs
are meeting face-to-face."''
Successful negotiations have always been a difficult
art, and nowhere is this more true than in the Middle East.
In fact, Arab and Israeli negotiators have a great task
ahead of them as they try to disentangle themselves from the
many years of war and bloodshed that form the legacy of
Britain's contradictory pledges to support both Arab and
Jewish national aspirations (in return for their support in
World War I). Indeed, the intransigence of each side is
mired in mutually exclusive tenurial claims while at the
same time the problem is exacerbated by their physical
presence and spiritual attachment to the land of Palestine.
'Crossette, 1992.
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Because Israel controls the territories of the West
Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, it naturally forms a
central focus of analysis for this work. But more pre-
cisely, Why has Israel been unwilling to relinquish the
occupied territories? Why have the other key players--
Syria, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and
the US--been unable to overcome Israel's political stance
and how have they prolonged the conflict? What embeds them
in the status quo? And, finally, what are the factors which
have contributed to the current state of affairs?
2
II. MILLENNIUM OF IDEOLOGY AND SECURITY
The Jewish people lived for centuries united by
religion, then lived united by anti-Semitism.
Now it lives united by the danger to Israel.
Washington Jewish Week
Despite compelling arguments for peace, the participants
have been unable to demonstrate the resolve needed to erect
a political solution because stronger counterforces have
prevailed. The most important of these are ideology and
security, both of which play central roles in the formation
of Israeli foreign policy.
The vitality of these two issues is derived from the
religious and secular experiences of the Jews since their
beginnings as a people. That they continue to serve as
guidelines for present day actions results no less from
their importance to Jewish life than it does from Arab
hostility toward Israel.
A. ISRAELI IDEOLOGY
Normative Zionism laid claim to the territory of bibli-
cal Israel although the question of boundaries was never
clearly defined in the Bible and was made even more confus-
ing by the territorial expansions and contractions of Hebrew
3
sovereignty in ancient Israel. What makes the Zionist move-
ment unique from other national movements is its basis in
divine promise (Genesis 15:18): "Unto thy seed have I given
this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the
river Euphrates." However, the Bible failed to specify
where land boundaries would intersect these rivers and it
also contained differing promises. For example, the divine
promise in Numbers (34:2), though replete with landmarks
which have since disappeared, is generally accepted by
scholars to represent sharply circumscribed borders in
comparison to that promised to Abraham in Genesis.'
If actual historical settlements are considered, the
borders of the Israeli kingdoms varied over thousands of
years, but its core comprised present day Jerusalem and the
West Bank. This area is considered the holiest in the Land
of Israel. In fact, rabbinical homilies have underscored
the close ties between Jews and the land of Palestine,
asserting that to live in the Land of Israel outweighs all
other religious commandments and that he who resides in the
Land remains without sin. 2
The idea of partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish
states arose following the Arab revolt in 1936 and was
formalized in the 1937 Peel Commission Report. Acceptance




of the recommendation for partition was debated among
Zionist leaders, not because they disagreed that all of
Palestine belonged to Jews by right, but because they dis-
agreed over the tactical wisdom of accepting a fraction of
the whole while forfeiting the rest. 3 Some of these
dissenting voices, in particular Judah Leon Magnes (1877-
1948) and Martin Buber (1878-1965), doubted that a Jewish
state could be established peacefully in Palestine and
believed that the implementation of a binational state
comprised of Jews and Arabs was the only politically viable
solution. Ultimately, history has shown that precedence was
given to partitioning as a result of the political
activities of mainstream Zionist supporters who advocated
such a policy.
Despite such internal controversies, however, Zionism
provided a constant source of ideological direction for the
founding fathers of Israel and later generations of
statesmen though, for Arabs in the Middle East, Zionism
obstructed the emergence of Palestinian nationalism.
1. Zionism as a Basis for Jewish Fulfillment
Secular Zionism originated in the late nineteenth-
century Europe as a nationalist movement. It provided a
viable reaction to a series of violent European pogroms
3 Isaac, 1976, p. 33.
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against Jews, 4 and provided a reply to the failure of
assimilation as propounded by the adherents of Jewish
Enlightenment, the Haskaleh, who sought to alter the
political and social status of the Jew. 5 Leo Pinsker's
Auto-Emancipation (1882) was considered the "first great
statement that the torment of the Jew" drove him "to assert
his own nationalism because the wider world rejected him." 6
Essentially, Zionism envisioned the cultural and
social fulfillment of Jews and their ingathering into a safe
haven, and propounded that anti-Semitism would be eliminated
once Jews established their own state and became a nation
like all other nations of the world. Yet, despite these
expectations, the basis of Zionist ideology continues to
divide both Israelis and Arabs. 7
Although largely a secular movement, Zionism revived
an old ideology, the Return to Zion, which had "permeated
4The pogroms of 1881 led to Pinsker's Auto-Emancipation
(1982); and the Dreyfus Affair in 1894 was a catalyst for
Theodor Herzl who put forth his solution in Der Judenstaat
(the Jewish State), published in 1896. Alfred Dreyfus was a
Jewish officer in the French army who was charged and
convicted of spying for the Germans, although he was later
exonerated. The extent of anti-Semitism unleashed by the
trial led Herzl to believe assimilation was impossible.
(Lewis, 1990, p. 25; Hertzberg, 1972, pp. 179-181, 201-203)
5Metz, 1990, p. 24; Drysdale and Blake, 1985, pp. 265-
266.
6Hertzberg, 1972, p. 181.
7Isaac, 1976, pp. 20-21; Kohn, 1970, pp. 278-284; Metz,
1990, pp. 24-26.
6
Jewish thinking since the earliest days of the Diaspora,"9
and which had also been kept alive for over 2,000 years
through Judaic ritual and prayer. And while modern Zionism
shifted the responsibility for the ingathering from the
Messiah to the Jews themselves--a heretical thought accord-
ing to orthodox rabbis--it nevertheless acquired religious
undertones as it ultimately called for the reestablishment
of Jews in their ancient homeland, a reunion that would
bring forth not only Jewish, but world redemption. 9
2. Zionism as a Basis for Arab Hostility
The manner in which Zionism was executed was to
inextricably draw Jews and Arabs living in Palestine into
conflict with one another, a situation initiated by Great
Britain because of its contrary promises as contained in the
Balfour Declaration and the Hussein-McMahon Letters. 1 0
8Dimont, 1962, p. 393.
9Drysdale and Blake, 1985, p. 265; Buber, 1976.
10From 1915 to 1917, a series of 10 letters were
exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon, Britain's high
commissioner in Egypt, and Sherif Hussein of Mecca, Prophet
Muhammad's most prominent living descendent and guardian of
Islam's holy sites. Britain pledged to support Arab
nationalism if the Arabs revolted against the Turks. But
whether the area of Palestine was included in the area in
which Britain would recognize Arab independence remains
controversial. The British Balfour Declaration of 1917
declared favorable government disposition toward "the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people" which would not "prejudice the civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."
(Drysdale and Blake, 1985, pp. 267, 269)
7
To begin with, the Zionists exhibited a naive lack
of consideration foi Arab sensitivities. Theodor Herzl, one
of the founders of the movement, paid little attention to
the Arab community within which Zionism was to be estab-
lished," yet he worked to secure the political support of
outside actors such as the Ottomans and the British.
Others, such as Judah Magnes or Ahad Ha'Am, who did
express concern regarding the impact upon Arabs, were
usually ignored. This was primarily due to beliefs among
mainstream Zionists (including Max Nordau and Herzl) that
modern agricultural methods and industry could accommodate
both populations, and also that Jewish immigration would
benefit Arabs by increasing their orange exports and by
providing profits from land sales. In short, Arabs and Jews
would share the land peaceably."2
But opposing this view was Vladimir Jabotinsky, the
founder of a more militant and expansionist Zionism known as
Revisionism, who, in the early twentieth century, was the
only leading Zionist to perceive the Arab-Israeli situation
as a winner-take-all, or zero-sum game."
Inflaming the situation in those early years were
Zionist efforts to change their lifestyle and image from the
"3Tetlie, 1970, pp. 1-5.
"I2 bid.; Laqueur, 1972, p. 225.
13Schechtman, 1970, p. 325; Seliktar, 1983, p. 122.
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passive Ostjuden, who engaged in middle-man trades, to a
people who worked the land and could be regarded by others
as tough and self-sufficient. Consequently, the pioneers
from the Second Aliyah (ascent or immigration) of 1904-1914
and onward, who established communal Jewish agricultural
communities, refrained from such earlier practices as
sharing pastureland with the surrounding Arab populace,
using Arab labor, or resorting to bribery to placate Arab
demands.14
The first influx of tens of thousands of Jews in the
early 1900s also provoked Palestinian hostility for many of
the same reasons new immigrants are resented anywhere:
peasants were afraid of change, shopkeepers and professional
men feared competition, and religious dignitaries rejected
opposing doctrinal schools cf thought."5 Arn economic con-
flict arose between Jews and Christian Arabs, with the
latter inciting Moslems to full-scale pogroms to drive out
their economic rivals. Cultural differences exacerbated
ethnic tensions; neither side cared to learn about the
other, and each held in contempt the other's lifestyle.1 6
14Laqueur, 1972, pp. 228, 232, 234, 237; Arian, 1985,
p. 14.
1 Laqueur, 1972, p. 245.
16Ibid., pp. 227, 237.
9
The mutual tendency toward isolation and separation
was encouraged with the advent of British and United Nations
(UN) partitioning plans and remains an integral aspect of
the existing Arab-Israeli conflict. Walter Laqueur writes
that the Arabs feared the Jews would "become masters of the
country" while they themselves "would be reduced to the
status of a minority." The anticipation of conflict and
possible Jewish dominion over Palestine was sensed more
correctly by the Arabs than the Zionists, who "were all
basically pacifists" and who thought they could "establish a
state without bloodshed."' 7
In retrospect, Arab apprehension seems justified.
Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first president, called for Arab
population transfers1 8 and the large-scale immigration of
Jews in order to make Palestine "as Jewish as England is
English." And while the Arabs might have initially accepted
the idea of a Jewish presence on religious or cultural
grounds, they could not accept their displacement as a
"convenience to largely secular Jewish interests."'19
17Ibid., pp. 239, 245.
"
8Mainstream Zionists such as Herzl and Aaron David
Gordon, the father of Labor Zionism, espoused gradual
displacement (Patai and Zohn, 1960, pp. 88-89). Jabotinsky
favored explicit plans for the removal of Arabs (Gordon,
1970, p. 25).
"
9Weizmann quoted in Taylor (1970, pp. 8, 12).
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The Zionist dream of a Jewish homeland in Palestine
exacerbated Arab hostility because it impeded their own
nationalist aspirations. Arab subjects of the Ottomon
empire were introduced to the concept of popular rights
during Napoleon's military foray into the Middle East, which
began with his expedition to Egypt in 1798. Emboldened by
the success of national liberation movements in the Ottomon
Empire as successive Balkan Christian states gained their
independence, and as a reaction to the rise of pan-Turanism,
Arab nationalism emerged in Palestine after 1908 and
reverberated throughout the empire as Arabs revolted against
their Turkic rulers during World War I.
While the Arab movement presented a competing
political force in Palestine, the Zionists failed to give it
any import as it was small and marked by fairly weak and
factionalized leadership."° More importantly, competing
political ambitions made the potential for a binational
state implausible. Martin Buber correctly observed that
Jewish and Arab cooperation might have been possible in
Palestine had not "the political element, that same desire
to achieve more than what [was] truly needed, been active on
both sides."',
2
°Laqueur, 1972, p. 244.
2 1Buber, 1983, p. 198.
Ii
Arab alarm that Zionist realization of the prophetic
Messianic Kingdom would stretch "from the Nile to the
Euphrates" continue to be inflamed by recurring Zionist
proposals for Israeli expansion. Oded Yinon's essay (1982),
"A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties," is
regarded by the Association of Arab-American University
Graduates (AAUG) as the "most explicit, detailed and most
unambiguous statement to date" of the Zionist endeavor to
exploit the internal self-destructive forces in the Arab
Moslem world so as to attain the eventual dissolution of
Arab states. The AAUG regards Israel's actions in the 1948
War of Independence and the Six-Day War as directed toward
the displacement of Palestinians and views Israel's inva-
sions into Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 as further evidence of
Zionist imperialism. 2 2
Israel's political-military strategy of peripheral
encirclement and its annexation of East Jerusalem and the
Golan Heights, both of which fell to Israel in the 1967 war,
have heightened such Arab fears. 23 Ironically though, such
plans stemmed in large part from inherent Israeli insecuri-
ties regarding their survival in a hostile Arab environment;
to wit, the fear that by not taking action the Jews would
22Nakhleh 1982; Shahak, 1982.
23The Golan Heights was annexed in December 1981, East
Jerusalem in 1967 and reaffirmed in 1980 (Metz, 1990, p.
xvi).
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"cease to exist within any borders.', 24 Indeed, the ques-
tion over borders may ultimately jeopardize Israel's
security because of Arab determination to delimit those
boundaries. Truly, it is this core issue thac is the most
crucial and most intractable area of disagreement within the
Middle East peace talks today.
3. New Zionism
Another serious challenge to a resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict has been the emergence of New Zionism
after the 1967 War. The principles of New Zionism derive
from the right-wing doctrines of the earlicr Revisionists
who claimed the right to both sides of the Jordan River and
appreciated the utility of militant action. New Zionism
currently incorporates both secular and religious elements,
and its adherents, supported by Likud and former members of
the Labor party, oppose any relurn to pre-1967 borders.s
Of significance, this movement is based on
traditional principles of Zionism anc links the state of
Israel to world Jewry: "A great Aliyah from all the
24Yinon, 1982, p. 10.
2SNew Zionism includes the secular Land of Israel
movement and the Ein Vered Circle. The former was begun by
past Labor leaders and the latter is comprised of kibbutz
(communal farms) and collective settlements. Gush Emunim
represents the religious component, which was officially
founded in 1974 in protest against the return of territories
demanded by Dr. Henry Kissinger's peace initiative. (Weiss-
brod, 1982, pp. 266-267; Seliktar, 1983, pp. 120-121; Isaac,
1976, pp. 6, 13-19, 46-48)
13
diasporas of the Jewish people is the fundamental condition
for preserving the national character of Eretz Yisrael"
(Land of Israel) .26
Also, the twin goals of aliyah and settlement are
inextricably connected: "The settlement of the entire land
required the aliyah of the world's Jews, and the world's
Jews need the entire land to provide them with the condi-
tions making settlement of millions of additional immigrants
possible.,,27
Inasmuch as governmental consideration of land-for-
peace once implied that the lands belonged to the Arabs, the
Land of Israel movement considers them rightfully Israel's,
justified on religious grounds, historical tenure, existen-
tialism, and fulfillment of Zionist ideology. Just as
importantly, it called for government recognition of
Israel's predominance in the region after the 1967 war.
Israel could now readjust "its ideological perspectives to
its power resouices', 28 while laying claim to the occupied
territories on the ideological precedent of New Zionism.
The religious component of New Zionism, Gush Emunim,
has been associated with settlement activity in the Arab
26Quote from the Land of Israel Movement Manifesto,




areas of the occupied territories. And while secular
Zionism justified the Return to Zion and the wars against
Arabs as a lack of choice, Gush Emunim "justifies itself by
faith and positive volition.",29 It offers an explicit
religious claim to the territories regarding their settle-
ment activity as the fulfillment of God's Law, whereby Jews,
by proving themselves the exclusive proprietors of Eretz
Yisrael, can hasten the Redemption, which they believe is
currently unfolding."
Consequently, Gush Emunim leaders have fought
against an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories
through the positive action of settlement and the threat of
civil war should they be stopped. Their doctrine under-
scores both the special mission of Jews as God's Chosen
People and the acceptance of Balaam's curse of isolation,
which they interpret as a blessing, an indication of the
"paramount moral imperative and raison d'etre of Israel's
international existence.''3'
29Porat, 1982.
3 0Weissbrod, 1982, pp. 268-269; Seliktar, 1983, p. 125;
Isaac, 1976, pp. 61-62.
31Seliktar, 1983, pp. 127-129; Balaam's curse (Numbers
23:9): ". . . Lo, a people dwelling alone and not reckoning
itself among the nations!"
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4. Zionism as an Arab Counterforce
In countering Arab arguments, the traditional
intransigence of the Israeli negotiating position has been
buttressed by the success of Zionist leaders to decrease the
appeal of Arab ideology even while they succeeded in shift-
ing the Israeli government to the right as the PLO's
position became more moderate.
The Zionists have also been effective in countering
Arab claims to Palestine. In the 1930s Jabotinsky argued
before various British commissions that, while Arab nation-
alism might have legal or moral justification, only the
Jewish people had the right to Palestine, not just for
reasons of national identification, but because as a people
without a state, Palestine represented the sole avenue for
physical survival: "When the Arab claim is confronted with
our Jewish demand to be saved, it is like the claims of
appetite versus the claims of starvation."02
Additionally, Zionists were able to counter
Palestinian prerogatives based on their recency of physical
tenure with the counterargument that Jews had occupied
Palestine for 1,800 years and Jewish settlement had been
continuous for over 3,000 years.
32Quote by Jabotinsky (1972); Isaac, 1976, p. 62.
33Isaac, 1976, p. 62.
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Moreover, even if the Palestinian argument were to
be considered, it was made meaningless by the New Zionist
introduction of different concepts of time. For whereas the
Palestinian justification is based on linear time, the
Israelis present the traditional Talmudic notion of fused
time--fusion of past, present and future--and the
restoration of past glory at some point in the future. This
concept has significance when it "organizes events as a
moral sequence leading to the Redemption."' 34
Zionist leaders also view Palestinian nati--nalism as
having been artificially contrived in order to block the
formation of the state of Israel. According to a ninth-
grade Hebrew textbook31:
Only from the year 1959 and onward did these states--
especially Egypt, Syria, and Iraq--raise in the meetings
of the Arab League . . . the concept of 'the Palestinian
entity',. . . in order to strengthen their propaganda
against the state of Israel. . .. Israel is the only
state in this region whose people . . . [have] lived in
the same land, spoken the same language, maintained
tradition which has not been severed, and retained the
same tie here for 3,000 years.
Former prime minister Golda Meir has associated herself with
the above view; in her words 36 :
34Seliktar, 1983, pp. 124-125.
31The History of the People of Israel, 1987.
36Golda Meir stated that view in 1969 (Cobban, 1984, p.
246).
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It was not as though there was a Palestinian people
and we came and threw them out and took their land away
from them. They did not exist.
An Arab holy war has been initiated against Israel.
Yet, this too has been countered with The Zionist declara-
tion of their own holy war as they proclaim it the Jewish
duty to destroy those who would destroy them, just as God
commanded Joshua to destroy the hostile Amalekites in
biblical times."'
Zionism may well have been effectively countered by
the Arab ideologies of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabis.n but for
their inability to attract or sustain any degree of Arab
unity. Unquestionably, Islamic fundamentalism failed to
unne the Middle East, although it gained strength in the
1970s and 1980s by presenting a viable alternative to the
failures of Western and Marxist style governments3" and
also by recouping traditional values. However, because
Islamism spread only slowly it failed to take political
root.
The problems exhibited by the Islamic Republic of
Iran contributed to that slow spread by illustrating the
difficulty in resolving a religious basis of sovereignty
with the theoretical basis of popular rule in the nation-
state. Internal oppression and unwillingness to compromise
"37Seliktar, 1983, p. 127.
38Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990, pp. 736-737.
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with Iraq for almost a decade in the war of 1980-1988, in
Muslim eyes, further discredited the Iranian regime. The
most asic obstacle to the spread of Islamism, though, was
that it was opposed by the Soviet Union and the United
States, as well as by Arab leaders who viewed such political
activism as a threat to their internal political power."
Pan-Arabism also never succeed in uniting the Arab
Middle East. Past attempts, notably the Egyptian-Syrian
union of 1958-1961, and the announced Federation of Arab
Republics in 1971 (to be comprised of Egypt, Libya and
Syria) failed because of differences in cultural and social
levels, discrepancies in economic wealth, contrasts in
ideologies and political structures, and the unwillingness
of state leaders to relinquish political power.
Furthermore, pan-Arabism and socialism split the Middle East
into two distinct camps: in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
a revolutionary-radical group comprised of Egypt, Syria,
Iraq, Algeria, Yemen and South Yemen were aligned against a
coalition of opposing monarchies, comprised of Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Libya, Kuwait and other Gulf states, and Morocco. 40
Despite the rhetoric of pan-Arabism, Arab regimes
were often opposed to one other, as in the case of Ba'thist




°Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990, p. 738, 758; Lenczowski,
1990a, pp. 755-756, 758, 760-763.
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Syria versus Ba'thist Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s. Invari-
ably, national interests had first priority. Witness
Egypt's peace treaty with Israel in 1979; and the Pales-
tinian desire for self-autonomy versus accepting absorption
into a greater pan-Arab nation; and the import Saudi Arabia
and other oil-rich states gave to pan-Islamism versus pan-
Arabism in order to maintain their separate sovereign-
ties. 41 As Martin Indyk has concluded, Saddam Hussein's
1990 invasion of Kuwait and the divisiveness of the Arab
response has finally "shattered the myth of pan-Arab
unity"'42 once and for all.
Another contributing factor to Israel's strong
ideological stand has been the shift of PLO tenets from a
rejectionist to a more conciliatory stance. This is most
clearly evident in the resolutions of the 17th Palestinian
National Congress (PNC), which no longer reflect a call for
the liberation of "their country" (even if the Palestinian
Charter continues to embrace that cause).'3
"
41Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990, p. 738.
42Indyk, 1991/92b, p. 75.
43Mansfield, 1990, p. 477; Seliktar, 1983, p. 132; "The
Palestinian National Charter" as revised by the Fourth PNC
Meeting, July 1968 (extracts) and cited in Cobban (1984, pp.
267-268). The PLO has tacitly moved away from the Charter
by refraining from referring to the Charter in every
Palestinian National Convention (PNC) resolution since the
17th PNC (Harkabi, 1987, pp. 43-52).
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The PLO's ideological rhetoric was further weakened
by Israel's political success, when in 1988, the PLO
officially renounced terrorism, acknowledged Israel's right
to exist, accepted a two-state solution, and began to
acknowledge the separate interests of the Palestinian
citizens in Israel." Indeed, despite the PLO's original
intent to wrest the land of Palestine away from Israel, the
PLO, today, would be happy to achieve statehood on only a
tiny portion of that coveted land. 4"
B. ISRAELI SECURITY
In addition to Zionism, national security has been of
equal importance in shaping Israel's foreign policy. As
such, it too presents an obstacle to Middle East peace. The
historical victimization of Jews, coupled with Israel's
encirclement by Arab states, have prompted what may appear
to be a paranoic emphasis by Israeli leaders on security.
And as will be shown, it has also prompted interpretations
of hostile Arab actions as being genocidal, rather than as
perhaps being natural reactions to Israeli foreign policy.
1. Anti-Semitism
Anti-Semitism has been important in molding the
Israeli psyche. A complex phenomenon, the prejudice against
"44Smooha, 1992, pp. 272-273; Heller, 1989/90, pp. 154-
155.
45Rubin, 1990, p. 138; Qasir, 1992.
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Jews has many roots and, indeed, there are at least three
religious factors that may elucidate its source:
1. The Jewish rejection of Christ as their Savior
(Matthew 27:11-25)
2. Muhammad's claim that the Judaic scriptures had been
falsified to conceal the foretelling of his mission as a
prophet of God"
3. The human jealousy that may have arisen because of
the biblical notion that Jews are God's Chosen People
(Matthew 1:1-17)
There might also be a psychological basis for anti-
Semitism as well. For, as postulated by Leo Pinsker, as a
people without a nation, Jews aroused a person's inherited
aversion to ghosts, a phenomenon he termed Judeophobia.
What is more, anti-Semitic feelings may have also stemmed
from the relegation of Jews to trades eschewed by others, a
stereotype forever immortalized by the Shakespearean
character, Shylock.
The ethnic basis of anti-Semitism in nineteenth-
century Europe and Tsarist Russia47 resulted in a series of
violent pogroms that reached an apex in the German Holocaust
in which almost six million Jews were murdered. 48 Yet, the
ultimate goal of Hitler's death camps--the annihilation of
"4rFarah, 1987, p. 50; Hitti, 1989, pp. 117-118.
47Metz, 1990, pp. 19-20.
"48In 1939, about 10 million of the estimated 16 million
Jews in the world lived in Europe. By 1945, almost six
million had been killed, most of them in nineteen
concentration camps (Ibid., pp. 48-49).
22
the Jewish race--was thwarted, and like a newly risen
phoenix, Jewish hope was reborn through the ideology of
Zionism.
But because Israel perceived Western unwillingness
to intervene on its behalf during crucial moments (e.g., the
Holocaust and the 1967 War), the Israeli people ultimately
decided to rely on themselves for their own defense and
indeed, to give security priority over all other
requirements. According to Mark Lewis, such concerns were
used to justify the harshness of their treatment of others;
i.e., the dispossession of hundreds of thousands of
Palestinian Arabs, the granting of only limited rights to
Israel's Arab citizens, and the retaliatory raids against
bordering states harboring Palestinian guerrillas.4 9
In fact, the impact of the Holocaust upon Jews, both
as individuals and as a race, have been institutionalized
through the school curriculum, literature, film, and other
socializing agents. They serve as a reminder and a warning
for future generations, ultimately to ensure the alertness
of their people and the world against a similar atrocity in
the future.
Jews have been without question, a persecuted
minority throughout their history, and one result of this
victimization is that, even after the establishment of their
49Ibid., pp. 5, 49.
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own state, the Israelis today continue to exhibit the
tendencies of a "mino-majority" (i.e., a minority recently
turned into a majority). As such, their psychological
disposition as a people remain "fraught with feelings of
inadequacy, insecurity, suspicion and hostility [that are]
often associated with the previous minority position.""
2. Palestinian Suffering
Even though Israel was established as a haven for
Jews, the Israelis continue to be a threatened people. The
impact of successive Arab-Israeli wars and count-ss border
conflicts reinforce their apprehension and elicit over-
reactions to any behavior that is perceived as threat-
ening, " a situation reminiscent of the early Zionist
pioneers who preferred to err on the side of toughness
rather than exhibit cowardice or weakness toward the local
Arab opposition. At the same time, the sheer magnitude of
their past suffering and vulnerability has increased the
Israeli tendency to discount the pain of others even as they
exaggerate the extent of the Arab threat.
The Palestinians, on the other hand, have demanded
Israeli recognition for the suffering they have endured as a
result of their own diaspora and their persecution at the
hands of Israel. And much as the Zionists did with theirs,
50Smooha, 1989, pp. 17-18.
51Ibid.
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the Palestinians seek an end to their exile and a fulfill-
ment of their own nationality as a people (by their return
to Palestine). As David Shipler says: "The longing for
return [to Palestine] is as integral to the Palestinian
nationalism that has evolved since 1948 as it was to the
Jewish Zionism that has moved thinkers and activists from
the nineteenth century onward.",5 2
But by couching their plight in parallel terms with
the Holocaust, the Palestinians have only evoked indignation
from a majority of Israelis."3 Abba Eban, for example, a
past foreign minister and one of Israel's elder statesman
who advocated discussions with the PLO, considers such
comparisons as "abrasive." Israeli leaders have taken this
one step further by denying the legitimacy of Palestinians
as a people. According to Meron Benvenisti, Jews do not
deny the existence of Palestinians as individuals, it's just
that they don't exist as a community.5 4
Part of the problem in acknowledging a separate
Palestinian identity is the lack of distinguishing charac-
teristics between Palestinian Arabs and other Arabs. The
Israeli argument on this is that, if the Arabs of the
52Shipler, 1987, p. 54.
53Ibid., pp. 57-63.
54Eban, 1989; Benvenisti cited in Shipler (1987, p.
77).
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central area of Judea-Samaria-Gaza are a separate people,
then so must be the Transjordanian Arabs to the ease and the
Israeli Galilean Arabs to the west. 55 Nevertheless,
Israel's failure to acknowledge the hardship of the Pales-
tinian situation continues to obstruct sincere reconcilia-
tion of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Israeli government has also acted to curtail the
manifestation of any distinctive Palestinian identity by
outlawing their symbols of nationhood. This includes a ban
on the displaying of their flag, the singing of their
national song, and even the scrawling of Palestine on a
wall. In addition, the casualties suffered by Palestinians
during Israeli border strikes are often omitted in media
reports. For example, the number of Arabs killed during
Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon was reported by the
Israeli press, yet the number of Palestinians who died in
the refugee camps was excluded even though they were the
hardest hit."6 So, while these actions may satisfy short-
term political utility and security concerns in strengthen-
ing Israel's position vis-a-vis the Palestinians, the long-
term danger is that the rift between Jews and Arabs is
widening even further.
55Begin, 1991, p. 23.
56 Shipler, 1987, p. '74.
For Israel, though, the alternative (acceptance of
Palestinian suffering) may be an impossible option. Because
as Benvenisti has observed, once the Israelis "accept the
symmetry that the other side is also a legitimate national
movement, then their own feeling about their own right and
legitimacy will be dimmed.",5 7 In the end, Anne Roiphe says
it may be that the Holocaust has left Israelis so "prone to
paranoia," they are unable to imagine "the pain of another's
exile" nor "the possibility of another's willingness to
change;" thus they are willing to endure "eternal warfare"
because they assume the Palestinians would dc the same to
them. 8
3. Institutionalized Stereotypes
Not only have the Israelis discounted the suffering
and plight of the Palestinians in pursuit of legitimate
national security concerns, but the institutionalization of
stereotypes by both Arabs and Israelis have increased the
radicalization of their respective populations. Certainly,
the suffering each side endures as a consequence of the
Arab-Israeli conflict may have made the allure of secular or
religious radicalization irresistible."
"
57Benvenisti quoted in Shipler (1987, p. 75).
58Roiphe, 1987 p. 65.
59Heller, 1989/90, pp. 170-171.
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And such radicalization of present and future
generations of children -inues to be promulgated through
the tools of socialization. Arab and Israeli stereotypes
almost mirror each other. Each smears the other as violent,
cruel and bloodthirsty, even down to a derogatory image of
the other as being cowardly. These stereotypes, produced
after decades of war and terrorism, have become so thor-
oughly manifested in the "literature, education, histoiy,
language and social mores on both sides that," as Shipler
observed, "they seem to govern the conflict as much as they
are created by it." One ironic manifestation of tnis
radicalization is that PLO extremists strive to preserve the
Palestinian refugee camps though the people live there in
poverty and in squalor. For there is a fear that, by
tearing down the camps "and by integrating into the
surrounding Arab cities and farms," the dream of all
Palestinians would once and for all be defeated"'.
The children of successive Palestinian and Israeli
generations are indoctrinated from an early age E-o that
they, toc, will carry on the torch of conflict. An excerpt
from a Palestinian schcol book reads 6l:
"
6
°Shipler, 1987, pp. 55-56, 182-200.
6` The unnamed elementary school textbook quoted in
Shipler (1987, p. 57) was used both in Jordan ard
surreptitiously in the West Bank.
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Palestine is my home and the path of my triumph ....
Strange faces are in my stolen land. They are selling my
crops and occupying my home. I know my path and my people
will return.
Certainly, such radicalization continues to
exacerbate relations between Palestinians and Israelis, and
between Arabs and Jews alike. And indeed, the
institutionalization of mutually derogatory stereotypes may
also be considered an adaptive behavior in the face of
almost 50 years of war. If, as many Israelis believe, in
the absence of political and military conflict mutual
prejudice would give way to decent relations and minimal
tensions, 62 then peace between the descendants of Abraham
may yet be possible.
4. Arab Rhetoric and Behavior
As Muslims, the duty to maintain the struggle until
Palestine (including Jerusalem) is justly returned to its
people, and until Palestine once again "becomes a land where
people of all religions, races and colors can live together
peacefully as they did for more than 1,400 years,",63 may be
regarded as a noble call for harmonious coexistence. Some
Arab actions even represent an implicit recognition of
Israel toward that end; take, for example, their acceptance




confidence building steps," or their government-sanctioned
press descriptions of Israel as a "Hebrew state" versus a
"Zionist foe"65
Likewise, Palestinian delegates continue to engage
in peace negotiations with Israel, despite their threats to
the contrary, and even at great risk to their own lives, for
they are regarded by members of Hamas and other extremists
as having betrayed the plight of their exiled compatriots.
Yet, while Palestinian decisions and actions have
become more moderate, no corresponding changes have been
made to their ideology. As a result, Israelis and their
supporters readily point out the hostility and aggression
contained in official PLO literature directed against
Israel. When reading the PLO's National Charter, one is
compelled to conclude that the organization would not be
able to reach its main objective (liberation of Palestine)
without first eliminating Israel's statehood. For example,
the charter still advocates an "armed struggle" to "liberate
Palestine" (Article 9) and it regards the liberation of
Palestine as a "national duty" aimed at "the elimination of
Zionism" (Article 15). Also, the major thesis of the PLO
"Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have ended the secondary
boycott of Israel and have rhetorically joined other UN
members in renouncing the UN resolution equating "Zionism as
racism" (Indyk, 1991).
"
65As noted in Syrian and Saudi press (Schlesinger,
1991-92).
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since its inception has been that of a protracted conflict
until the end of time, while, in addition, militant PLO
offshoots have taken names reflecting traditional Arab
themes of heroism and revenge such as "Heroes of Return" and
"Vengeance of Youth."'6 6
That Yasir Arafat publicly renounced terrorism in
198867 while in private he continued to tolerate militant
behavior toward Israel only served to further destroy PLO
credibility even as his antithetical behavior justified the
security arguments propounded by Israeli hawks.
The rise of the extremist Muslim organization,
Hamas, has also strengthened the position of Israeli
hardliners. The organization's agenda is to destroy the
state of Israel, which they regard as having been implanted
on Muslim holy land, and to create in its stead a state
established according to Islamic law where people of all
faiths, including Jews, would live. Hamas' recent killings
of soldiers next to the Gaza Strip and Hebron and the cruel
murder of border patrolman, Nisim Toledano, prompted the
Israeli government to expel 415 of its leaders in January of
"The two groups are part of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Amos, 1988, pp. 366, 369-
370).
67Heller, 1989/90, pp. 154-155.
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1993 and to declare the organization its number one
enemy."
As Hamas and other groups continue to subscribe to
and execute the preachings of radical Islamic fundamental-
ism, they only increase Israel's siege mentality and
therefore strengthen the vitality of Zionist ideology.
Arabs and Palestinians alike have been willing to
spout warlike rhetoric--like the position expressed in 1967
when the Arab Le gue summit in Khartoum pledged the three
famous no's: no peace with Israel, no recognition of
Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. 69 But also
consider the fact that many Arab leaders view Israel's
destruction as a method of solving the Arab-Israeli dispute,
a situation made clear by Saddam Hussein's missiles in 1991
and by Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser on the eve of the 1967 war
when he announced "[war] will be total and the objective
will be to destroy Israel." Making matters worse, Syria's
Hafez al-Asad, just another of these doomsayers, declared in
1988 "we are looking forward to the fateful battle with the
Zionist enemy. ,70
68
"Hamas-the Muslim Fundamentalist Organization which
Wants to Destroy the State of Israel", translated from the





°Quoted in Indyk (1991/92a).
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In the face of such anti-Zionist rhetoric, then,
Israel should be genuinely concerned with the intentions of
its neighbors; and indeed, twenty states remain in a "state
of war" against the Jewish democracy,71 a posture best
expressed by Iran's continuing call for the destruction of
Israel. And what should be thought of the 1989 Casablanca
summit of the Arab League, when support was voiced there for
the Palestinian right of return as well as for the rallying
of Arab forces to achieve strategic parity to contain
Zionist aggression.72 For even if this does not overtly
point toward Arab willingness to throw Israel out to the
sea, it certainly raises the specter that maybe they would
relish the chance to try.
There is also the matter of the Muslim holy war, or
Jihad, that has been maintained against Israel by militant
PLO factions. Even though the December 1989 Dakar summit
7 1Begin, 1991, p. 26; According to the public affairs
officer at the Israeli Consul General's office in San
Francisco (my telephone conversation on 12 November 1992),
the twenty states are comprised of the following: Algeria,
Bahrain, Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and
Yemen.
7 2Schlesinger, 1991-92; Begin, 1991, pp. 31-32.
73Recent border clashes between Israel and Hizballah
forces in southern Lebanon led to a reiteration of the
pledge to continue "the march of jihad" by the Hizballah
Forces Command ("Hizballah Issues Statement on Jordan Valley
Attack", 1992). During the same time period, the Islamic
Resistance movement, Hamas, issued their own statement:
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of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) quite notably
omitted this term from its final communique; the ICO
nevertheless, continues to loudly condemn "unjust Israeli
aggressions" and to regard the Palestinian issue as the
"biggest Islamic cause of this generation", 74 as indicated
in a May 1992 press statement. So, while Islamic doctrine
encourages peace, it does so only if justice is not
sacrificed: "Be not wary and fainthearted, nor cry for
peace when you should be uppermost; for God is with you."
(Quran 47:7)
In coupling Arab rhetoric with evidence of other
activities, it is, of course, no wonder that Israeli leaders
naturally consider their security in jeopardy. And their
concern today would seem to be amplified by the regional
escalation of the arms race, which all Arab nations, save
Egypt (Camp David Accords), continue to pursue.
More specifically, Syria currently represents the
premier military threat to Israel after Iraq's demise in
Desert Storm. And, indeed, it continues to press ahead in
an unabated arms buildup in the hope of attaining strategic
parity with Israel, spending $2 billion in Saudi foreign aid
after the Gulf War on various weapons such as Scud missiles
"There will be no peace with the occupiers." ("Hamas Urges
'Comprehensive Confrontation'", 1992)
74
"ICO Condemns 'Unjust Israeli Aggressions'", 1992.
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from North Korea, T-72 tanks from Czechoslovakia and,
possibly, M-9 missiles from China. 7"
Israel's sense of insecurity is further underscored
by the various Arab states that continue to be ruled by
oligarchies or dictatorships, neither of which are conducive
to change and both of which strengthen their base of power
through force, censorship, and propaganda while using hatred
as a political tool--much of it directed, in this case,
against Israel."6 Adding to the problem, the presence of
Israeli-Arab citizens and almost two million Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip pose internal security problems
for Israel in the event of hostilities because they could
become radicalized by Arab states into a fifth column.
So, although Israel's depiction of a monolithic Arab
threat directly strengthens its own security arguments,
Arabs and Palestinians have clearly contributed to this
perception. And as has already been shown, they have
accomplished this through menacing rhetoric such as
"throwing Jews out to the sea;" by violence against symbol-
laden targets of Israel, like children, hostages, prisoners
of war, and synagogues; and by the special targeting of Jews
and Israelis, as during airline hijackings and, most
7 5Maull, 1990, p. 118; Begin, 1991, pp. 31-32.
76Begin, 1991, pp. 34-35.
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memorably, the massacre of Israeli athletes in the 1972
Munich Olympics.`
5. Geographic Factors
Another hindrance to a successful resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict derives from geographic constraints.
In fact, Israel's security concerns are exacerbated by its
small size and the concentration of its population into two
major cities, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. And because most
Israelis believe that "even one military defeat would mean
the end of their country,",78 they are united in opting to
forego a "Zionism of quality" for security. It should come
as no surprise, therefore, that the people of Israel, whose
pre-1967 borders were only nine miles apart at their narrow-
est point, view withdrawal as tantamount to an invitation to
their own funeral. 79
Indeed, most Israelis believe their survival is at
least partly based on their possession of adequate terri-
tories. Even as far back as 1917, when the Zionist leaders
were planning the boundaries of the Jewish homeland, they
sought to avoid the mistakes of the ancient Israelites by
keeping enough land for proper military defense, by control-
ling water resources to provide a sound economic base, and
"77Seliktar, 1983, p. 132; Metz, 1990, p. 276.
78Metz, 1990, p. 267.
"79Begin, 1991, pp. 26-27.
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also by acquiring access to both the Red and Mediterranean
Seas to establish a commercial entrepot.8 0
The recent proliferation of medium- and long-range
ballistic missiles in the Middle East has not negated the
argument over borders; to the contrary, Israeli hardliners
argue that the significance of the Golan, Judea and Samaria
is derived, not from the extra miles those areas add to
Israeli territory, but from their rugged typography which
permits defensive positioning. Tactically, this would
enable Israel's small standing army to hold off a massive
Arab ground attack until reserve forces are in place--as
ostensibly, Israel's control of the Golan Heights provided a
vital defense buffer against the Syrian army during the Yom
Kippur War, a situation that permitted Israel to maintain
control of its northern regions. 81
Israeli leaders may also fear the unknown; namely,
that were they to give up the West Bank they might create a
political vacuum, thereby inviting the establishment of a
radical PLO or Islamic fundamental state, either of which
would pose a direct security threat. 82 As a result, the
territories impart upon Israel a greater sense of self-
sufficiency and protection.
8 01saac, 1976, pp. 28-29.
81Begin, 1991, pp. 29-30; Pipes, 1991.
82Begin, 1991, pp. 29-30.
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Finally, in light of the siege mentality that
characterizes the Jewish psyche, Jews are probably more
convinced than ever that they should not trust anyone but
themselves to determine their ultimate fate."3 And it is
precisely this attitude which, like the Berlin wall, will
also have to fall if divisiveness in the Middle East is to
ever be overcome.
6. Relationship with US
Another factor which has become integral to Israel's
security is its relationship with the US. It has come to
depend upon the US for diplomatic and military assistance,
particularly during times of crisis. American statesmen
were instrumental in arranging cease-fires in each of the
Arab-Israeli wars and President Carter successfully brokered
the Camp David Accord between Israel and Egypt. American
leaders have, one after the other, not only reaffirmed their
support of Israel, but have made that commitment an official
part of the American national security strategy. For
Israel, the strong political guns of the US have enabled it
to dictate, to a great extent, the terms under which it
would negotiate for peace with its Arab neighbors.
American military aid has also bolstered Israel's
security. The importance of US military assistance to
Israel was best exemplified by the emergency airlift of
83Hollis, 1991.
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weapons during the dark days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and
the continuation of massive rearmament in the years
following. The extent of Israeli reliance on American
weapons systems has been such that in 1989, of the 764
combat aircraft in Israel's inventory, all but 170 were
American-made.84
The terms of US military aid have also become
exceedingly generous; the US initiated direct aid grants in
the mid 1970s, and from fiscal year 1985, converted almost
$2 billion in annual military aid to an all-grant form.
Likewise, American economic aid is used to service Israel's
foreign debt as incurred from past military purchases."
Certainly, Israel's leaders acknowledge the
necessity for continued American support and few question
America's pledge to ensure Israel's survival as a nation-
state. By the same token, they have doggedly maintained
their independence of action as they must also be aware that
Israeli views of Israeli security and American views of
Israeli security may not always coincide.
"84The Military Balance 1992-1993, pp. 111-112.
8 5Tartter and Mason, 1990, p. 322.
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III. LACK OF POLITICAL WILL
The difference between a successful person and
others is not a lack of strength, not a lack of
know-Ledge, but rather in a lack of will.
Vincent T. Lombardi
A. ISRAEL
Israel's incentives for compromise on the occupied
territories have been tenuous. Indeed, a common line of
thought has it that, on this issue, Israel has nothing to
gain and everything to lose. For not only does Israeli
society enjoy the economic benefits of holding onto the
territories, but it does so with the confidence that Arab
forces are not strong enough to displace it. This kind of
thinking is as much a result of Israel's regional military
superiority as it is due to a supportive world community
that continues military and economic assistance while
maintaining diplomatic and trade relations, irrespective of
Israeli actions.
On the other hand, there is the fear that Israel's
leaders might invite internal catastrophe by relinquishing
the territories voluntarily. Although the 1992 elections
have shown there is indeed a national willingness to trade
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land for peace, many zealots in Israel are nevertheless
adamant that territorial settlements should not be uprooted.
Only time will tell if such ardor will entail serious
consequences for Israel.
1. Issue of Territories
Israel has opted to tolerate the nebulous status of
a de facto peace as it continues to impose a military rule
upon the territories captured in 1967. What seems to be
societal inertia, however, may be better considered as a
reflection of an ideological stalemate prompted by two
opposing, yet equally convincing political arguments. For,
while Israeli political and religious hawks have argued that
the territories provide greater security from Arab attack
and fulfill the messianic destiny of Jews as heralded in New
Zionism, counterarguments from Israeli doves have also been
propounded; namely, expanded borders only increase the
barriers toward true peace, and diminished security only
frustrates the original aim of Zionism--the ingathering of
world Jewry into a safe haven.'
This split in Jewish public opinion has been docu-
mented in various studies. According to Sammy Smooha's
survey in 1988, public opinion was almost equally divided
'Currently, only 30 percent of the 13.5 million Jews in
the world live in Israel (Smooha, 1992, p. 1).
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between those who favored settlements and those who did
not.' However, when E.sked how strongly the respondents
felt about their positions, Smooha found that about 80 per-
cent of the Jewish public were willing to comp-omise, one
way or another, if a peace settlement could be reached.
Significantly, 42 percent of these same respondents said
they would not act against a government decision to withdraw
from most of Judea and Samaria in return for peace, while
only four percent indicated they "would act against the
dec-sion with all means, including violence." So, while
public c'pinion on whether settlement activities should be
continued is clearly divided, there seems to be a consensus
that land-for-peace is a possibility. 3
Israel has already experienced the trauma that a
forcible uprooting of settlers can bring. The evacuation of
8,000 Jewish settlers from the Yamit district in the Sinai
following the peace treaty with Egypt was such an example.
The ensuing confrontations between anguished settlers and
unarmed, tearful soldiers were brcadcast daily across
Israel's public television and radio stations; 4 and
although the eventual and successful evacuation of settlers
20f the half who were generally opposed, 27.4 percent
had reservations and 22.1 percent were against settlements
(Ibid., Tab. 6.3, p. 60).
'Ibid., Tabs. 6.5, 6.6, p. 62.
4Lustick, 1982/83, p. 386.
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could be considered as further evidence that settlements are
never irreversible, it also fueled arguments to the
contrary.
The difficulty of such a governmental action in the
face of Gush Emunim's militancy not only provokes fear of a
civil war, should a withdrawal from Samaria and Judea ever
take place,' but it could also lead to political disgrace
for the party undertaking that unpleasant task. Thus, it is
politically safer for any Israeli statesman to maintain the
state of occupation than it is to end it.
A recent example highlighting the sensitivity of
this issue pertains to the Golan Heights. In September 1992
an accord between Israel and Syria regarding the Golan
Heights seemed imminent and was widely reported in the
media, as well as by Israeli and Jordanian go-Ternment
sources. According to the accounts, it would be based on a
possible Israeli withdrawal and subsequent lease-back of a
portion of the lands from Syria (in return for full peace
and security).6 However, one month later, Israel's new
prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, reiterated his campaign
5Ibid.
6A possible Israel-Syria agreement was reported in news
sources and also voiced by Mr Harry Kney-tal, Israel's
consul general and by Dr. Abdel Salam Majali, head of the
Jordanian peace delegation, during separate briefings to the
Monterey Chapter of the World Affairs Council on 9 and 12
September 1992, respectively.
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stand, saying he would yield only a portion of the Golan
Heights, while, at the same time, he publicly chastised the
media for indicating otherwise.'
Territorial benefits provided to Israeli society
also help propagate governmental incentives to maintain the
status quo. In an area where water resources are scarce,
almost 80 percent of Israel's fresh-water needs are supplied
by the West Bank, with half of it consumed by Israeli
farmers and settlers in the West Bank, and the other half by
the Jewish population in Israel proper. The proximity of
the West Bank to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and the lure of
government subsidies have also made the area an attractive
bedroom community for urban commuters as well as an ideal
location for high technology industries. 8
Moreover, Israeli society so far has been willing to
absorb the economic and political costs of occupation even
though it is not yet profitable to do so. Governmental
expenses in maintaining the territories have dipped from 1.5
percent of GDP in 1988 ($600 million) to 0.7 percent in
1989.9 Palestinian unrest, inspired by the Intifada, has
substantially died down and Syrian nationals in the Golan
7
"Six Israeli Soldiers Die in Attacks", 1992.
'Gowers and Walker, 1989; "Stealing Arab Water", 1992;
Peretz, 1986, pp. 59-78.
9
"Economy," 1990, p. 520.
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Heights are few in number and relatively untroublesome."
Indeed, according to Benvenisti, a complete Israeli with-
drawal may now be irreversible because the infrastructure
and settlement of the territories have become integrated
with Israel proper. Additionally, the economy of the West
Bank has been more fully combined with Israel than it ever
was with Jordan, both as a source of unskilled labor and as
a market for finished goods."
2. International Relations
That Israel's international relations have not
suffered appreciably because of its military expansionism,
is another factor that further reduces the incentive to
finalize negotiations. Unquestionably, the substantial aid
Israel has received from the US has not only ensured its
survival as a viable nation-state, but it has contributed to
Jewish intransigence in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Israeli peace activists, notably Mattityahu Peled, a
former Israeli general and war hero, have urged the US to
stop this aid. And Tikva Honig Parnas believes that
cessation of American aid is "the only pressure that can
"
0These Syrians are comprised primarily of Druze, who
are not recognized as an Islamic sect by mainstream Muslims,
and so fit just as well in Israel as in Syria (Pipes, 1991).
"Benvenisti cited in Harkabi (1987, pp. 43-52); Grose,
1985, p. 84.
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make any impact on this society."'12 But American assist-
ance has increased in importance for the Israeli government,
not only to sustain its defenses, but to ensure its economic
survival and absorption of hundreds of thousands of Soviet
immigrants. In fact, President Bush's previous denial of a
$10 billion housing loan guarantee to Prime Minister Yitzhak
Shamir while his Likud administration erected new housing
settlements in the occupied territories may have helped oust
Shamir in the 1992 Knesset elections.
Additionally, with the end of the Cold War and Tel
Aviv's diminished strategic importance to the US, continua-
tion of the Arab-Israeli struggle may be Israel's best bet
for sustaining US support as Israel capitalizes on America's
cardinal policy of ensuring Israel's right to exist. More-
over, once peace is achieved, Arab states would quickly
achieve political parity with Israel in American eyes, as
illustrated in the case of Egypt after signing the Camp
David Accords." 3
But in returning to the issue of American foreign
assistance to Israel, it is necessary to examine the details
of that monetary flow to appreciate fully the generosity of
the American taxpayer. For instance, to preserve Israel's
"
2peled cited in Bruzonsky (1991, pp. 30-31); Parnas
quoted in Rosenwasser (1992, pp. 136-138).
13National Security Strategy of the US 1991, 1991, p.
10; Pranger, 1988, p. 443.
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security and economic viability, the US provided $53 billion
in loans and grants from 1949-1991, most of it since the
mid-1970s and under the most generous terms offered to any
country. Furthermore, Israel is distinguished as the
largest annual benefactor of American military and economic
aid. When smaller assistance programs and unofficial
sources of aid (e.g., credit, Israeli bonds, tax deductible
contributions) are tallied in, the American tax burden is a
costly $10 billion per year. This does not include the $10
billion housing assistance loan granted by President Bush,
which according to Robinson, would cost the American
taxpayers $119 billion should Israel default on the loan.14
Despite the conflict, Israel's bilateral relation-
ships with other states have continued to satisfy the
country's political, as well as its economic requirements
and needs. In fact, while the effects of the 1967 war have
prompted many members of the international community,
particularly the Soviet Union and the Third World, to sever
relations with Israel as a der astration of alignment
against Israeli imperialism, many states nevertheless have
maintained political and economic contacts, albeit covertly.
Moreover, the Soviet Union and East European states resumed
14Pound, 1991; Grose, 1985, pp. 60-64; Tivnan, 1987, p.
227; Rubenberg, 1986, pp. 323, 333; discussion with Glenn
Robinson, assistant professor, Naval Postgraduate School,
1992.
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contacts with Israel in 1986, while the North African states
broke the diplomatic embargo in the early 1980s.1 5
Also bolstering Israel's economy, the European
Community--where political support of Arab states and the
Palestinian cause was undoubtedly conditioned by commercial
interests and dependence on Middle East oil--still repre-
sents Israel's second largest trading partner, as it
accounts for about 40 percent of Israel's foreign trade. 16
Israel's arms exports have also assisted in keeping
political ties open to all regions of the world, and were
instrumental in China's recent announcement providing full
diplomatic status to the Zionist state. India's desire to
assume a greater role in the Middle East, particularly in
view of the current peace talks, has also prompted the
initiation of diplomatic relations.'"
So, while much of the international community sub-
scribes to the tenets of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and
hence does not recognize the legality of Israeli occupation,
Israel nevertheless continues to receive substantial
benefits from the status quo, both in terms of the strategic
.
5Grose, 1985, p. 107; Metz, 1990, pp. 242-243.
'
6Metz, 1990, pp. 170, 241; The European Economic
Community receives about 38% of Israel's exports and




and economic importance it derives from the territories and
also in regard to its relations with the US. Verily, thanks
to Israel's regional military superiority and continued
diplomatic and economic ties to the rest of the world,
Israel has not yet been truly pressured to relinquish the
territories, nor is such a prospect likely to happen soon.
3. Internal Disagreement
Because the issue of occupation is such a divisive
subject in Israeli society, historically, Israel's political
leadership has been averse to disrupting the status quo and
has been willing to tolerate the accelerated settlement
activities of the Likud administration. Until very
recently, any proposal to do otherwise was tantamount to an
invitation to internal opposition and strife.
In highlighting this push and pull of Israeli
politics, it is noteworthy that former Prime Minister Shamir
traditionally faced demands for greater flexibility though
hardliners wanted less; and when Laborites proposed cabinet
acceptance of Mubarak's ten-point peace initiative in
October 1989, the motion was defeated on a tie vote. 18
Moreover, when Likud's proposal for Palestinian autonomy
during the Middle East peace talks almost led to a Knesset
vote of no-confidence in the administration, the result was
"'Heller, 1989/90, p. 159.
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an acceleration of parliamentary elections from November to
June 1992.
More than any other concern, the question of the
occupied territories has split the Israeli public along
ethnic, class and political lines, as well as between those
people who are reluctant to relinquish any part of the
territories and those who favor trading trade parts of it
for peace, with only a small minority willing to give all of
it back. This major dichotomy, according to several Israeli
intellectuals, could well lead to a civil war if exacer-
bated, and the more that the US condemns settlement activ-
ity, the "harder it becomes for Israelis to draw back." For
as Grose also says, the demagoguery of "standing up to the
Americans" is highly appealing to a wide sector of the
Israeli electorate. 19
B. SYRIA
Syrian leadership represents another obstacle to an
Arab-Israeli peace. Throughout most of its history, Syria
has rejected the boundaries drawn by the imperial powers in
the Middle East. And President Hafez al-Asad's pursuit of
an anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and pan-Arab policy jus-
tified his territorial claim to a Greater Syria, which alto-
gether, comprise the basis of his anti-Western leadership.
19Peretz, 1986, pp. 76-77; Grose, 1985, pp. 115, 119.
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Despite Asad's participation in the Middle East peace talks,
his continuing rhetoric makes it doubly hard for him to
change his policy toward compromise, for he has placed
himself in a similar situation of past Arab statesmen who
were in the uncomfortable position of negotiating for peace
with Israel. 2"
Asad may actually derive domestic and regional power
from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Domestically, his political
campaign against Israel has enabled him to maintain the
ruling position of the Alawite minority because he has both
been able to tap into the anti-Zionist sentiment of disen-
franchised Sunnites and to avoid contention in the domestic
arena. As a protagonist of anti-Zionism, he has effectively
diverted attention from the Alawites past friendliness with
Zionists and has also veiled the Ba'thist loss of the Golan
Heights under controversial circumstances. And despite the
austere economic environment of his country, Asad's foreign
policy priorities have rationalized enormous defense expend-
itures--30 percent of GDP and 55-60 percent of total
government outlays.2
Currently, tacit obstructionism against a real peace
seems to be a logical move for Asad. For by continuing to
2 0Pipes, 1991; Rabinovich, 1984, pp. 38-46; Rubin,
1990, p. 137; Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 1991, pp. 2-6.
21Pipes, 1991, pp. 36-52; Rabinovich, 1984, pp. 38-46.
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participate in the Middle East peace talks he incurs Ameri-
can and Saudi goodwill, though he risks nothing by not
making faster progress on substantive issues. As things
currently stand, an Arab-Israeli stalemate serves to delay
Israel's regional integration, and once peace is achieved
Syria's regional influence could likely be offset by a
possible Tel Aviv-Amman-Cairo axis even as Israel's leverage
in Lebanon might also be increased. 22 In fact, the only
real losers in a protracted deadlock are the Palestinians
themselves, whom Asad nevertheless claims to represent.
C. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Even though its demands have weakened through the years,
the PLO has long been considered by Arab states and Pales-
tinians alike as being the sole legitimate representative of
the Palestinian cause. Yet, as a result of internal frag-
mentation, poor political leadership, unfavorable conse-
quences of terrorism, and the demoralization of its libera-
tion movement, the PLO today has failed to present itself as
a significant political challenge to Israel. Of equal
consequence is Chairman Arafat's continued enjoyment of the
status quo and, more particularly, the prestige he has
gained while directing a multimillion-dollar organization.
22Pipes, 1991, p. 49; Rubin, 1990, p. 137.
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1. Internal Fragmentation
The PLO is fragmented internally due to a number of
factors, primarily owing to the physical dispersion of
Palestinians throughout the Middle East. As a result,
regional cadres were formed which operated independently of
each other and which tended to adopt the ideological orien-
tation of the host country. For example, the Palestinians
in Gaza flocked to either the call of Nasserism or the
Muslim Brotherhood; those in Syria and Iraq adopted the
Ba'thist ideology, while those in Lebanon and in other parts
of the Gulf were influenced by the Arab Nationalist move-
ment. 2 3 The effect of this disjointedness was that the
separate cadres were easily manipulated by the various Arab
leaders of host countries who sought to further their own
political agendas at the expense of their rivals.
As the presence of Palestinians and their militant
offshoots presented a possible threat to the host country's
internal stability, Palestinians have also suffered from
Arab repression. 2 4 The PLO as a whole, therefore, was
never fully able to formulate a consistent doctrine, while
neither was it able to implement an effective policy or
engender any meaningful claim to legitimacy.
23Amos, 1988, pp. 368-369.
24Cobban, 1984, pp. 23-31.
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This factionalism also made it easy for the militant
al-Fatah, led by Arafat, to take over the PLO after the 1967
war. His leadership, however, did not immediately improve
the situation, and in 1974 the regrouped PLO suffered
renewed dissidence when opposition arose against Arafat's
call for tactical and ideological moderation, which included
his proposed acceptance of a mini-Palestinian state.2"
This internal split was originally compounded by Arafat's
decision to incorporate ideologically diverse groups into
the formal decision-making structure of the PLO, and the
wedge was further deepened by his subsequent tolerance of
militant guerilla factions.
According to John Amos, a three-way split finally
erupted in 1980 as a result of ideological factionalism,
inter-Arab connections, and generational conflict. 2 6
Naturally, the fractious and unstable nature of the PLO
prompted American leaders to doubt the organization's
political utility. Indeed, even if the US believed they
could arrive at a political settlement, American officials
2 5Amos, 1988, pp. 372-375; Mansfield, 1990, pp. 469-
479.
26A centrist group which opted for rapprochement with
Jordan and identified itself with the historic leadership of
the PLO; a second group, which also had connections to al-
Fatah leadership and demanded an independent Palestinian
state; and a rrjectionist group which opposed any
negotiation and was backed by Syria, Libya, and Algeria.
(Amos, 1988, pp. 375-376)
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were skeptical of the PLO's ability to carry out its side of
any agreed upon deals."7
2. Political Leadership
As was hinted at in the previous section, the PLO's
political position has been further weakened by its poor
record of leadership. Guided by men who were consumed with
the desire to liberate all of Palestine from Israel, they
would consider nothing less. A proposal, advanced by a
small number of Palestinian dissenters after the 1967 war,
to carve a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip by signing a peace treaty with Israel, was considered
to be heretical. For the PLO, such a suggestion was
antithetical to the prevailing concept of Palestinian
nationalism. And PLO opposition was buttressed by the
majority of Arab opinion. The Jordanians perceived such a
plan as undermining their sovereignty and claim to the West
Bank. Correspondingly, the Arab world at large viewed a
separate West Bank initiative as circumventing an
appropriate Arab solution to an Arab problem (i.e. the
displacement of Arabs by a Zionist state) and as
perpetuating Israeli control over the territories."8
Israel considered its capture of the territories in
the Six-Day War a unique opportunity to bargain for peace.
2 7Cobban, 1984, pp. 245-261.
28Sahliyeh, 1988, pp. 26-33.
55
However, Arafa•'s stubborn adherence to the "Palestinian
revolution", negated such a possibility and the collective
Arab response became forever embodied as the famous "three
no's" of the Khartoum Summit in 1967. Conversely, had
Arafat and the Arab world responded positively to Israel's
gesture, the international community might have increased
pressure on Israel Lc implement UN Resolution 242.29
The Palestinian ,utonomy scheme would have to wait
almost twenty years before it would be seriously pursued by
the PLO. It was exactly this kind of uncompromising dogma
which led Israeli leaders to believe that Arafat was not
really concerned with peace at all and which led them to
believe that the PLO was in reality nothing more than an
Arab rl,'y to uproot the state of Israel from the Middle
East.
As such, Arafat's decisions have hurt his
organization, both politically and financially, and as a
result its political strength today is no match for that of
Israel's. The PLO involvement in the Lebanese Civil War,
for instance, and the subsequent Israeli retaliation against
Palestinian refugee camps led to a bitter internal schism
between moderate and maximalist factions of the PLO; it also
29Ralph Magnus, associate chairman and associate
professor, Department of National Security Affairs, lectures
on NS3361, "Problems of Government and Security in Israel",
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Spring 1992.
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contributed to the loss of Arafat's credibility among
European supporters.30
But his latest egregious mistake came in 1990 when
his endorsement of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait
undermined the activities of the Intifada in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip; this same support also cost the PLO at least
$85 million in yearly Saudi contributions and another $40
million from Palestinian workers in the Persian Gulf who, as
a result of losing their pre-war jobs, are now searching for
work. 3'
More recently, even Arafat's plane crash points to
his apparent lack of foresight as it was precisely this
April 1992 event that led Palestinian leaders to levy new
criticisms toward him regarding his failure to prepare for
such a crisis by not having pre-selected an acceptable,
alternative leader. In a similar vein, they have also
reproached him for not yet developing an alternative plan of
action in the event the Middle East peace talks should
fail.32
In the aftermath of such mistakes by Arafat, the
Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, and Syria no longer seem to
3
°Mansfield, 1990, p. 477; Grose, 1985, pp. 108-109;
Drysdale and Blake, 1985, p. 287.
31Indyk, 1991/92b, pp. 81-83; Walker and Andoni, 1990.
3 2Hijazi, 1992.
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regard the PLO as being the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people. In fact, following the Saudi
lead, they have severed monetary support as well. 33
3. Terrorist Tactics
As was mentioned earlier, Arafat's incorporation of
the various militant guerilla factions into the PLO has
significantly contributed to that organization's weakened
political position. For not only did this inclusion impede
any unity of thought or purpose within the PLO, but it also
never allowed Arafat to limit the terrorist activities of
these groups, a situation that backfired against the PLO.
For with thousands of armed Palestinian fighters inhabiting
various Arab states, it was soon perceived these freedom
fighters were a threat to Arab stability. As a consequence
of such fears, they were expelled from Jordan in 1970 as,
otherwise, they have been closely watched and controlled by
their host states. At the same time, the PLO's so-called
military successes against Israel have been few and, in any
case, not very effective in furthering the Palestinian
cause.'4
The use of terrorism has also undermined inter-
national and Israeli sympathy for the Palestinians, as their
violent tactics have tended to overshadow their cause. In
33 Indyk, 1991.
34Drysdale and Blake, 1985, p. 286.
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recognizing this, Palestinian delegates are of late hard at
work trying to achieve a peaceful resolution of their situa-
tion even though they face internal opposition to their
efforts, particularly from the militant factions. 3" But it
should be pointed out that the ability of these delegates to
carry on their negotiations is made even more uncertain by
Israel's settlement and deportation activities, which
continue to this day.
Despite their apparent setbacks in the Arab-Israeli
conflict, however, mainstream PLO rejectionists still seem
to advocate a continuation of the conflict until some time
in the future when they believe the preponderance of Arabs
will inevitably shift the balance of power to their
advantage.36
4. Demoralization
In the meantime, political failures, internecine
conflicts, and the successfulness of Israel's suppressive
measures have taken their toll on the Palestinian national
movement. For as Wendy Kristianasen says":
35Most opposed to the peace process are the Islamic
fundamentalist Hamas movement, the Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Gauch, 1991).
36




The intifada continues in an institutionalized form, but
it has lost its heart. Anger and demonstrations still
erupt in response to events, but it is only the gangs of
masked youths who still go about their business without
any real enthusiasm.
Even the international media has lost its romance
with the Palestinian independence movement, casting doubt on
the continuing political utility of the PLO. The reluctance
of Arab leaders to honor their financial pledges to the PLO
may have increased intraorganizational violence; personal
actions to extort money or settle private scores were
conducted under the pretext of national resistance; and
Israeli collaborators or those who publicly encouraged
moderation were punished or assassinated. 38 As a matter of
record, about 500 Palestinians have died at the hands of
other Palestinians since the Intifada began in 1987.•9
Perhaps the most demoralizing failure for the PLO,
though, has been its inability to achieve Palestinian
independence despite an historic concession at the end of
1988 which, first, affirmed the principle of partitioning,
second, renounced terrorism, and finally, accepted Israel's
38Mansfield, 1990, pp. 469-477; Heller, 1989/90, pp.
154-155.
39 "Arabs in Occupied Lands Hoping to Halt thi Killing
of Informers", 1992; The intifada began spontaneously in
December 1987 as an effort to resist Israeli occupation
(Rosenwasser, 1992, p. 15).
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right to exist. 40 Their lack of success was blamed on US
and Israeli actions--the former for not endorsing Palestin-
ian statehood and refusing to discuss the substance of a
final-status agreement, and the latter for its opposition to
Palestinian statehood and its rejection of any direct deal-
ings with the PLO. And despite Arafat's historic 1988
compromise, Israeli leaders have remained skeptical of
Arafat's intentions, pointing to his 1974 speech where he
spoke only of the broader aim of replacing Israel with a
democratic, secular state.4 1
5. Multimillion-Dollar Organization
Meanwhile, Arafat's lack of political progress seems
not to have seriously undermined his personal power, inter-
national prestige, or popular support. Lebanese Druze
leader, Walid Jumblatt, says that Arafat and his PLO com-
panions are the "richest revolutionaries in history."'4 2
Indeed, Yasir Arafat, as chairman of the PLO, as spokesman
for al-Fatah (the PLO's main component), and as commander-
in-chief of the "forces of the Palestinian revolution,"' 43
manages a $275 million operation and has control of al-Fatah
4 0Kristianasen. 1991; Heller, 1989/90, pp. 154-155;
Mansfield, 1990, pp. 469-479.
41Kristianasen, 1991, pp. 9-10; Heller, 1989/90, pp.
154-155; Mansfield, 1990, p. 477.
42Mansfield, 1990, p. 477.
43Hijazi, 1992.
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investments worth more than $2 billion. In addition, the
PLO has a 14,000 man army and has diplomatic offices in more
countries than Israel." That Arafat has cultivated a
personal, rather than an institutional, basis of leadership
was evidenced by the crisis of succession that emerged
during his brief disappearance in April. 45
In sum, Arafat has contributed to the failure of the
PLO to represent an effective movement for peace, having
increased the already fractious nature of the PLO through
the incorporation of additional militant factions, through
his toleration of the use of international terrorism, and
through his failure to capitalize upon opportunities to
advance Palestinian interests. And his dubious status as
one of the richest revolutionaries in history may further
undermine his will to achieve an expeditious political
resolution of the conflict when weighed against his own
future prospects once independence is achieved.
D. UNITED STATES
While the Arabs and Israelis have ultimate responsibil-
ity in resolving their conflict, both sides in general have
looked to the US for assistance in brokering a resolution.
"44The PLO has offices in some 90 countries (Walker and
Andoni, 1990).
45Arafat was missing for 15 hours after his plane
crashed in the Libyan Desert (Hijazi, 1992).
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As the only remaining superpower after the Cold War, and as
the only player with a strong relationship with both Arabs
and Israelis, the US could be the key in unlocking the door
to peace. By the same token, it appears the US will
continue to rely on the Arab-Israeli negotiating process as
the primary, if not the sole, method of resolving their
mutual grievances.
Why has America refrained from taking any other
measures, remaining content with the lack of progress in the
status quo? Simply put, America may lack the desire to take
any extraordinary action: national security has been
maintained despite the conflict; domestic issues have
increased in importance versus those on the international
scene; and, administrative policy on the Middle East has
been reactionary at best.
1. National Security
American national security, both in regards to
strategic interests in the Middle East and domestic
requirements, continues to be satisfied, and as such, may
impede any initiative outside the current peace process.
Underscoring this comfort with the status quo, the alliances
that America has enjoyed with both Arabs and with Israel
have provided strategic benefits to the US, particularly
during the Cold War. These associations were instrumental
in containing Soviet aggression and maintaining friendly
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control of strategic resources--the most important of which
has been oil. At the same time, US bilateral relationships
with Muslim states were minimally affected by American
support of Israel, and American access to oil was disrupted
only briefly--and with mixed success--during the embargoes
of 1967 and 1973.46 Moreover, the increasing economic
interdependence between the West and the oil-sheikdoms has
enhanced the free flow of oil at moderate prices.
The spectacular rise in the price of oil during the
1970s, though still comparatively low, shifted regional
influence from the anti-Western states of Egypt and Syria,
to Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing states. Conse-
quently, this shift assisted American interests in promoting
moderation and stability in the Middle East.
That US-Muslim alliances have been minimally
affected by the US-Israeli relationship is evidenced in
close American ties with Iran before the Islamic revolution,
with Arab states in the lower Persian Gulf, post-Nasser
Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq during the mid-1980s. Even American
relations with the so-called radical states of Syria and
Iran have improved in recent years with the dissolution of
their communist benefactor, the Soviet Union.
"46McFadden, 1987, p. 8; Jacobs, 1991.
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2. Competing Issues and Problems
Domestically, the US has had to contend with the
interests of its own military-industrial establishment and
the requirements of national security in keeping open large-
scale weapon production lines. This may have detracted from
the political will that would have been necessary to effect
a swift and comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace accord. Arms
sales to foreign consumers, for example, particularly
countries in the Middle East, have brought in substantial
revenues to the US economy. In fact, the US supplied 18
percent of the region's total arms imports from 1984-1988
with a gross value of $16.3 billion, with cash sales to oil
sheikdoms (for example, Saudi Arabia bought $5.8 billion in
the same period)." In addition, these purchases helped to
recycle petrodollars back to the US.
With the end of the Cold War, the drawdown of the US
military has heralded a decrease in domestic arms consump-
tion. Consequently, foreign sales have acquired increasing
importance, not just as a source of revenue, but also to
ensure necessary production lines remain operational for the
future needs of the American military. As Charles Duelfer
says, "Individual companies and government agencies are
looking at exports with new vigor, if not desperation, to
sustain defense production capabilities." And recently, a
"
47World Military Expenditures, 1990, pp. 9, 13.
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"State Department cable was sent to all diplomatic posts
expounding upon . . . and advising them to support the
marketing efforts of US defense firms abroad."'48
Additionally, American military leaders are
concerned with the continuing spate of force reductions,
wherein reduction figures of 25 percent have ballooned to
possible cuts of up to 50 percent. Certainly, such military
concerns reflect upon institutional interests as much as
they might also reflect upon genuine national security
dictates.
As a large-scale European ground war has now been
essentially ruled out, a new national military strategy has
established major regional crises as the basis for threat
planning, and the "most uncertain region for the immediate
and perhaps long-term future is the Persian Gulf and Middle
East." More specifically, "dealing with Israel and its
immediate Arab neighbors will continue to pose a significant
challenge and will be an important ingredient to future US
national security planning."'49 Thus, as the US plays the
Arab-Israeli peace broker, the parochial interests of the
defense establishment and the legitimate concerns regarding
production-line capabilities might negate the full devotion
48Duelfer, 1990, p. 13; "New State Directive", 1990.
49Ullman, 1991, pp. 83-84, 180.
66
of American efforts toward resolving the current Arab-
Israeli stalemate.
Of course, competing concerns have diverted American
attention from the Middle East in the more distant past as
well. A case in point occurred after 1967 when American
leaders were involved in the difficult execution of the
Vietnam War and in controlling massive anti-war demon-
strations across the nation. While President Eisenhower was
able to take an active involvement after the 1956 Sinai Raid
to ensure an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, US
preoccupation with Southeast Asia precluded a similar effort
after successive Arab territories fell to Israeli forces in
1967. What made this latter situation even more unworkable
was that the US was also concurrently involved in the Cold
War and was unlikely to seek coordinated UN action between
the two superpowers, as would have possibly occurred had
international relations been warmer. 50
Still, there are other issues which pull attention
away from the Arab-Israeli situation. The first of these is
the concern of American statesmen in trying to rebuild the
fledgling Russian economy even as they seek to safeguard the
nuclear resources and technology of a former enemy.
Secondly, it is doubtful the US will initiate any action to
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict outside the framework of
5 0Wright, 1975, p. 29.
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the current Mideast peace talks. In fact, even the
involvement of Secretary of State Warren Christopher in the
Arab-Israeli peace process gave way to American interests in
other areas of the world.
It is also unlikely the US will offer foreign aid as
an inducement to sign a peace accord, as it was able to do
with Israel and Egypt a decade earlier. President Clinton
will be constrained from offering such enticements, for
America itself suffers from an ailing economy, a $4 trillion
deficit and a multitude of costly, domestic problems.
President Clinton's former presidential campaign rival,
Texas businessman, Ross Perot, continues to lambast
Clinton's poor performance in remedying the deficit, and
Perot's periodic press statements only help revive memories
of his statistic-laden graphs and flip charts which first
forced public attention upon this issue.
In addition to Perot's clarion call for fiscal
responsibility, the Clinton administration has to tackle a
slew of costly, domestic problems. During the presidential
campaign, Clinton pledged to address the restoration of
urban America, which was given new urgency following a burst
of spontaneous riots in Los Angeles and other major cities
after the Rodney King verdict in May 1992. He also promised
to rectify rising medical costs by instituting national
health care. In addition, the conversion of military
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industries to civilian uses, the reform of the political
system, the continued costs of the savings and loan clean-
up, and the default of government-insured mortgages worth
billions of dollars all require time and money.
In short, any one of the above contemporary issues
is, by itself, important enough to most Americans that it
will remain focused in many minds for some time to come;
each of these issues demand the president's attention and
further decrease the priority of the Arab-Israeli conflict
on the national agenda.
But Clinton has not neglected the issue entirely and
he has used careful appointments to put new vigor into the
peace process. His selection of Dennis Ross, a close aide
to President Bush, as the administration's special
coordinator for Middle East peace talks, and of Assistant
Secretary of State Edward P. Djerejian as US ambassador to
Israel, signal his intention to place high priority on a
break-through in the talks. According to Oded Aran, Deputy
Director, Department of Foreign Affairs in Israel, Economic
Matters, Israel views both men as objective and highly
experienced in Middle East matters, and it regards Clinton's
choices as indeed indicative of his earnestness to
accelerate progress in Arab-Israeli negotiations." The
"
51Oded Aran, interview on the Israeli news program,
Schmonae b'Erev, (Eight O'Clock in the Evening), SCOLA, 20
June 1993.
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administration has also taken a much more active role than
its predecessor, offering bridging proposals, such as an
offer to help guarantee Israel's security if it returns the
Golan Heights to Syria.52 Similarly, Clinton's staff has
been "alternately cajoling and chastizing the
participants" 53 in order to r-use them from their inertia.
Despite all that, the administration has refrained
from taking measures outside the framework of direct
negotiations. After all, this is the path of least
resistance and least effort: it satisfies Israel's
dictates; it is agreeable t- the Arabs; and it requires as
little or as much effort as the US is willing to invest.
Again, due to competing American concerns, it is incumbent
upon the Arabs and the Israelis themselves to bridge the
road to peace. As Martin Indyk, the new head of Middle
Eastern affairs in the National Security Council, suggests,
such competing interests further narrow the window of
opportunity for American involvement. 54
3. Lack of US Peace Plan
In its own lack of a clear vision for peace, America
it seems has always preferred to rely on Israeli and Arab
"





proposals, which as of yet have come to naught. To begin,
the Middle East was placed low on the US list of priorities
at the start of the former Bush administration, which
exhibited a marked "preference for the status quo." And the
earlier efforts by Secretary of State James Baker in
commencing the peace talks and push-starting any stalls were
really in repayment for, and were only possible because of,
earlier Arab support for the US-led coalition during Desert
Storm."
Furthermore, Bush's removal of James Baker from his
position as secretary of state to manage the presidential
re-election campaign at a crucial juncture in the peace
talks indicated quite clearly the low priority that was
assigned by the administration to US mediation efforts.
More recently, President Clinton has stated and demonstrated
his intention to seek continuity on Bush's foreign policy
endeavors.
American foreign policy in the region has been
further hampered by a trilateral, American-Israeli-Arab,
approach to Middle East relations. Such an endeavor makes
for a policy that is passive, ambiguous and reactive,
because the interests of each corner of the triangle inevit-
ably become confused with those of the others. This
55Heller, 1989/90, p. 154; Quote by Indyk, 1991/92b,
pp. 70-71, 83.
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arrangement is also potentially inadequate for the
protection of vital American interests.5 6
Where former President Bush may have attempted to
influence the Arab-Israeli peace process, though, might have
been through sheer political gamesmanship, a strategy that
may have played a key role in allowing Labor to emerge
victorious over Likud in the June parliamentary elections.
For although Likud touted itself as being the only party to
have made peace with an Arab state,5 7 the Labor Alignment,
which steadfastly has been willing to trade land for peace,
claimed it alone was able to propose a formula that would be
acceptable to both Jews and Palestinians."8 Bush, for one,
apparently took to heart such assertions.
In any case, Labor managed to garner the support of
the Republican administration.5 9 Indeed, President Bush's
decision to withhold a $10 billion housing assistance loan
until Yitzhak Shamir agreed to stop new construction was
seen as a catalyst for Labor's electoral victory. America's
carrot-stick approach may have made the economic costs of
56Pranger, 1988, p. 444.
51"Likud, Labor, Meretz Launch Election Ads 24 May",
1992.
"
5 8Discussion with Dr. Ralph Magnus, associate chairman
and associate professor, Department of National Security





Likud's unwavering settlement policy mo- • dissatisfying to
the Israeli public (particularly to the hundreds of
thousands of immigrant Soviet Jewish voters) when weighed
against the programs that would suffer because government
spending would be directed elsewhere. Just as unpalatable
was the prospect of higher long-term unemployment rates if
the absorptive capacity of the country could not accommodate
the tremendous influx of new citizens.
Generally, American peace efforts have often come
only in the wake of a major crisis, even though since 1967
every American administration has at least partly sought to
broker a successful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
albeit if in vain. Given its poor track record, there are
limits to US staying power, particularly with a problem it
did not create. Consider, for example, Aaron Auerbach's
conclusion regarding the Middle East conflict6":
This problem doesn't have a solution. Maybe you can
control it, contain it, keep it from blowing up. But
solve it? Never.
6
°Pranger, 1988, pp. 434, 447; Auerbach, quoted in
Shipler (1987, p. 77), is a psychologist who emigrated to
Israel in the 1970s.
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Political structures shape political processes.
Kenneth Waltz
Even as many key figures or groups of people lack the
necessary political will to resolve the Middle East
conflict--because, as it has been shown, it is not in their
personal interests to do so--there also exist certain kinds
of organizational constraints which by their very nature
also inhibit a solution. Indeed, while people with differ-
ent ideologies, goals, and agendas may come and go, one
thing that always remains constant is that they must work
within the boundaries of the institution in which they find
themselves. This section will now examine such
organizational constraints as they pertain to the Middle
East problem'.
A. ISRAEL'S POLITICAL/MILITARY SYSTEM
The nature of Israel's political system minimizes
outside inputs to foreign policy as might come from the
public, academia, media and special interest groups.
'Organizational constraints faced by the United Nations
are examined in Section V.
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Likewise, government policies in the area of foreign affairs
reflect the priorities of the political elite in maintaining
its power base, its institutional stability, as well as the
status quo. Consequently, the interests of the political
and military elite in continuing the status quo--and
especially, the path of least domestic resistance--have
traditionally negated any serious governmental attempt to
respond to the peace movement, as exemplified in the failed
Labor peace proposal to the Knesset after the 1967 war.
1. Party Politics
Israel's political system has evolved from one that
has embraced ideological and organizational creativity, to
one that today is increasingly dominated by party politics.
The preeminence of large political parties, which are them-
selves controlled by political careerists who are labelled
by Samuel Huntington as apparatchiks, has produced a stable
government, but, according to Asher Arian, a professor of
political science at Tel Aviv University, their rise has
also imposed a pattern of conformity, timidity, and loss of
enterprise.2
The oligarchical nature of the political structure,
from the choosing of Knesset candidates for a party list to
the maintenance of party discipline during Knesset proceed-
ings, have entrenched the political power of the parties,
2Brzezinski and Huntington, 1985; Arian, 1985, p. 59.
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especially the two largest and most influential--Labor and
Likud.'
The system is now designed to perpetuate the
influence of the large parties, not only through the Labor
controlled Histadrut, which is the country's largest
civilian employer, labor representative and provider of
health services,' but also through favorable Knesset legis-
lation regarding the financing of election campaigns and the
allocation of parliamentary seats.'
Adding to the political uniformity in Israel, both
Labor and Likud actually present similar views with regard
to the occupied territories and the Palestinian question.
3 In February 1992, the Labor party deviated from
traditional backroom procedures by letting 150,000 of its
registered members formulate the party list.
4The Histadrut wields considerable economic, social and
political power for the Labor party, which has controlled
the Histadrut since its inception in 1920 as a federation of
trade unions. The Histadrut represents the interests of 80
percent of Israel's work force. Health services provided
through the Histadrut's Kupat Holim sick fund cares for 75
percent of Israel's citizens. Health services provided to
members of the religious parties helped promote long-term
political cooperation between Labor and those parties.
(Arian, 1985, pp. 8, 50, 204-210)
'Legislation passed in 1969 mandated election campaign
payments to the parties based on their proportional
representation in the Knesset, with more monies allocated to
parties with greater representation. The d'Hondt system is
used to recalculate surplus votes after the initial
allocation of Knesset seats has been made. This system,
introduced through the Bader-Ofer Amendment (1973) uses a
formula which favors the larger parties to the detriment of
the smaller ones. (Ibid., pp. 106, 123)
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For example, neither party advocates withdrawal to the 1949
borders or the establishment of a Palestinian state in
presently occupied territories; and neither favors a total
ban on new settlements.
Big party politics aside, there are some ideologi-
cally extreme viewpoints being offered by a few smaller,
less powerful political parties. Although this has helped
to minimize the impact from right-wing hardliners, it has
also diminished the political influence of the peaceniks.
One of these smaller parties, the Democratic Movement for
Change (DMC), emerged in 1977 and captured 15 Knesset seats
in its attempt to curb Likud's aggressive settlement
policies in the occupied territories, especially during the
Camp David negotiations. However, its role was marginal and
the DMC eventually disbanded at the close of its four-year
term in office. 6
Another organizational constraint that impedes the
implementation of individual peace initiatives may come from
the parliamentary system itself, which depends upon coali-
tion forces to function, or in other words, large, compro-
mise-oriented bodies that expect personal adherence to party
discipline. 7 The problem with this kind of organization
was perhaps best illustrated by the necessity to form a
6Ibid., pp. 90-93.
7Isaac, 1976, pp. 9-10; Klieman, 1990, pp. 107-130.
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National Unity Government tNUG) from 1984-1988 when neither
Labor or Likud could establish a ruling coalition with the
smaller parties. The final arrangement resulted in the
temporary suspension of any substantial action on the Arab-
Israeli peace progress as both parties, lacking any consen-
sus for change, were forced to support only the status quo
during the NUG administration.
2. Lack of Outside Inputs
While the structure of Israel's political system has
favored the predominance of the large political parties and
their leaders, it may have concomitantly constrained the
opportunity for inputs into government foreign policy
decisions from the media, the general public, and academic
institutions. According to Aaron Klieman, a professor of
international relations at Tel Aviv University, prevailing
security concerns and reliance on politicians for informa-
tion or support may have minimized such inputs. 8 The
nation's cumulative experience with wars and crises have
made these groups more willing to give the government a free
hand in national security strategies and foreign policies.
Even though the media has formed an important link
between the government and the public since the Yishuv (pre-
state Israel), its role in foreign policy has been limited
due to state censorship on all news items. The willingness
8Klieman, 1990, pp. 107-130.
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of the press to accept such censorship derives from the
importance of national security. Indeed, it is widely known
that the government exercises direct control over many of
thp radio and television stations, and that some of the
daily newspapers are affiliated with political parties. 9
Ultimately, the media routinely depends upon government
officials for much of its news details and is therefore
unwilling to jeopardize continued access to such
information--the lifeblood of its existence.
The general public has also played a minimal role in
directing foreign affairs, for not until the 1992 parliamen-
tary election did the public send a clear mandate to the
government for peace. Many reasons have been offered by
Israeli analysts for the negligible public role. One
perception is that Israelis are not inclined toward politi-
cal activism on anything but bread-and-butter issues and
that, where partisan foreign policy interest groups do
develop, they tend to either disband after a government
decision is made or to reorganize into a political party."°
For example, Ha Moetza l'Shalom u'Bitachon, the
Council on Peace and Security, was formed in 1988 to
encourage territorial comprom~ise and provide viable solu-




than through direct physical control over the land and the
people. It was challenged within a few months by a rival
hardline group, and both groups subsequently dropped from
public sight shortly after the 1988 elections; Klieman
regards this phenomena as characteristic of political
movements in general in Israel."
Even the Peace Now movement has been criticized, by
Peled, as being essentially ineffective, limited to a few
demonstrations each year, and without any real desire to
"shake the system."' 12
A direct voter-candidate relationship and greater
access to political leaders have also been minimized in
Israel's political system because people vote for party
lists rather than for individuals. 13
There have also been minimal foreign policy inputs
from academia and think tanks. Yehoshafat Harkabi, a
professor of international relations at Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, and Aaron Klieman have criticized their compatri-
"Ibid., p. 118.
12Bruzonsky, 1991, pp. 30-33.
"13Klieman, 1990, pp. 109-119; Some changes in Israel's
electoral system have been noted. In 1992, the Labor party
conducted the first-ever primary style election by allowing
its constituents to formulate the party list. As a result,
Rabin and Peres were elected to the number one and two
spots, respectively (Salpeter, 1992). Additionally,
election rules have recently been changed to permit direct
elections for prime minister, beginning in 1995.
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ots for not taking a "lead in molding public and official
thinking.,,14
Harkabi expressed his disappointment with Israeli
intellectuals who share his belief that a settlement with
the Arabs is imperative but who also refuse to support him
in public or to disseminate his writings through the educa-
tional system. Klieman, meanwhile, suggests that the
reluctance on the part of intellectuals to get involved on
an institutional basis may not only stem from disparate
viewpoints and the inherent difficulties in proposing a
viable policy alternative, but that it may also reflect a
reluctance to enter what may be perceived as "dirty
politics" as well as an aversion toward opposing the
national swing to the right since Likud's rise to power in
1977.15
Additionally, institutions comparable to the Council
on Foreign Relations in the US or the Royal Institute of
International Affairs in Britain have only recently been
established in Israel. Verily, until rec'ently, a review of
Israel's international relations and foreign policy
14Klieman (1990, p. 115) with similar sentiments by
Harkabi (1987, pp. 45-46).
"
15Harkabi, 1987, pp. 45-46; Klieman, 1990, pp. 115-118.
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decisions were limited to the usual political party
forums.16
3. Israeli Military
Israel's demonstrated conventional military
superiority, and the widely accepted fact that Israel is the
only regional member of the nuclear club, is another
organizational constra-int that enables Israel to maintain
the status quo. Although Israel has never publicly
acknowledged its possession of nuclear weapons, Israel is
purported to have developed low-yield nuclear warheads,
expanding its nuclear options from strategic warfare, to
tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use."1
But would Israel actually use these weapons?
Regarding this question, Seymour Hersh reports that during
the Yom Kippur War, Israel targeted its nuclear missile
launchers against military headquarters locations in Cairo
and Damascus, and also states that Israel was fully prepared
to implement the "Samson Option" if battlefield events (an
imminent Arab victory) required Israel to do so. He also
suggests that in 1973 the US conceded to an immediate and
massive resupply of Israel's conventional armaments in order
to avert a Middle East nuclear war." 8
16Klieman, 1990, pp. 107-130.




Nuclear weapons aside, the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) are considered able to defeat any likely combination
of Arab conventional opponents well into the near future."9
This is partly a result of the IDF having received, and
maintained, a favorable balance of arms since the beginning
of the Tripartite rationing system in the early 1950s20 as
well as its having developed a professional and combat-ready
military. The fact that Israel also has in place an
effective indications and warning system only adds to its
combat readiness.
Conversely, the Arabs have lost every major military
conflict they have fought, and the strength of their mili-
tary coalition was further diminished when, first, Egypt
negotiated an Israeli peace treaty in 1978 and, secondly,
when Iraq was routed in last year's Gulf War. In addition,
history has shown that Syria alone, Israel's arch-enemy,
cannot win on the battlefield with Israel, a fact graphic-
ally highlighted during Israel's 1982 invasion of
Lebanon.21
19Drysdale and Blake, 1985, pp. 307-308.
2 0The Tripartite Declaration consisted of Britain,
France and America and lasted from 1950-1955. Its
administration provided Israel with the quantitative and
qualitative resources to "defeat any likely combination of
Arab opponents." (Jabber, 1981, p. 118)
21For example, on 9 June, 70 Syrian and 100 Israeli
jets engaged in the largest air battle of contemporary
warfare. During that dogfight, 29 Syrian MIGs were shot
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In light of all this, Israel, with its military
superiority still firmly intact, may now be more incli:.ed to
insist on permanent retention of the West Bank while, con-
currently, Israel's ability to indigenously produce a large
array of weaponry reduces susceptibility to American pres-
sure to give up the contested territories. 22
Even though the issue of the occupied territories is
unresolved internationally, Israel's military has enabled
Israeli society to enjoy a de facto peace with Arab neigh-
bors. And Israeli reprisals against neighboring states, for
tolerating or promoting border raids into Israeli territory,
have been instrumental in both reducing Arab incursions and
promoting tacit acceptance of Israel's post-1967 boundaries.
Meanwhile, Jordan and Syria have sought to avoid
border confrontations with Israel by suppressing PLO
militants, by respecting Israel's "red line" areas in
Lebanon, and by engaging in secret political meetings to
discuss mutual border concerns. Indeed, while a Saudi-
backed newspaper in 1985 called upon Muslims to "exterminate
Israel once and for all," Saudi Arabia was unwilling to
down without the loss of a single Israeli plane. The
following day, Syria lost another 35 planes in a second
massive air battle. (Seale, 1988, pp. 376-394)
22Brzezinski, 1991; Sanders, 1990/91.
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martyr itself as long as its oil fields were in reach of
Israeli retribution.23
Arab organizational structures are also less than
effective against Israel; consider how the Arab League was
substantially weakened after suspending Egyptian membership
in 1979 and how the Gulf Cooperation Council, without a
military policy or force, has been impotent in the face of
Israeli martial actions. 24
One other way in which Israel's military contributes
to the status quo derives from the domestic role of the
defense industrial establishment. For as the most powerful
special interest group in Israel, 2s its efforts are
directed toward protecting the economic, military, and
political benefits it enjoys and which it does not want to
give up. Indeed, the vital role that defense plays in the
continued survival of Israeli society has enhanced both its
political power as well as its ability to capture a large
share of the national budget. There is little question
that, if Israel ever comes to peaceful terms with its Arab
neighbors, the military budget would probably be reduced and
23Maull, 1990, p. 120; Tartter, 1991, pp. 37, 224;
Rubin, 1990, pp. 137-138.
24Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990, pp. 738-739.
2
'Klieman, 1990, p. 114.
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equipment holdings curtailed2 6 -- an unattractive prospect,
to say the least, to those in the defense establishment.
B. PLO DISUNITY
While the political system within Israel has narrowed
the source of foreign policy inputs, thereby strengthening
an Israeli hardline approach toward the Arab-Israeli
conflict, events such as the Palestinian Diaspora have
worked against the unity of the PLO as a representative
organization. As a result, the PLO lacks the kind of strong
vertical political links that exist in most conventional
pyramid-structured organizations. This weakness is com-
pounded by Arab and Israeli attempts to infiltrate, split,
or undermine the al-Fatah. 27 Additionally, the incorpora-
tion of tactically and ideologically diverse, and sometimes
opposing, factions under the umbrella of the PLO have
further limited the effectiveness of Palestinian negotiators
in the current peace negotiations.
But even as the possibility for peace with Israel draws
nearer, Palestinian unity nevertheless suffers. Indeed, it
is this very fragmentation and lack of coherence that
impedes the current peace process. Harry Kney-tal, consul
general of Israel, recently remarked that the Palestinian
26Duncan, 1984, p. 115.
27Amos, 1988, pp. 23-31.
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delegates have no clear chain of command and that each
speaks for a different faction even as the composition of
the delegates continually changes and has a high turnover
rate--a situation that makes negotiations difficult at
best.28
C. AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
Although analysts differ on the reasons underlying the
special US-Israel relationship--be they ideological,
religious, cultural, moral, and/or strategic--all seem to
agree that the American electoral and legislative processes
have enabled the Jewish community to shape American foreign
policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
1. Jewish Lobby and PAC Power
Primarily because of its close working relationship
with Congress, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC) has long been successful in its lobbying efforts on
behalf of Israel. Currently, AIPAC has a staff of 100, a
budget of $12 million, members from more than 55,000 house-
holds, and its own political action committee (PAC) that was
established in 1976,29 though, since then, 124 additional
pro-Israel FACs (allegedly controlled by AIPAC) have emerged
2SAddress by Harry Kney-tal, Israeli Consul General to
the US, (based in San Francisco), to the Monterey Chapter of
the World Affairs Council, 9 September 1992, Monterey, CA.
29Grove, 1991; Curtiss, 1990, p. 15.
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onto the American political scene. To illustrate AIPAC's
influence with American policy makers, in the 1988 general
elections the above mentioned pro-Israel PACs spent a
combined $5.4 million as compared to $3 million as expended
by the National Association of Realtors. The next four
largest PACs each spent only $2 million. 3"
AIPAC's primary strength is its special relationship
with Congress, which it has fostered in several ways. First
of all, each of its lobbyists are former congressional aides
who enjoy unique associations with current mtrhrs of
Congress and their staff. Secondly, AIPAC "attends every
hearing, every session, every mark-up" affecting Israel.
Moreover, AIPAC functions as a daily "information resource
for virtually every federal office candidate [by providing]
a dependable source of information about the Middle
East.,,31
AIPAC's considerable power is no doubt due to the
enormous outlay of campaign monies that are typically made
available to House and Senate candidates during critical
elections. And if it were not for the fact that presi-
dential elections are financed almost entirely with public
"
3
°The next four largest PACs after AIPAC are the
Teamsters Union, the American Medical Association, the
National Education Association, and the National Association
of Federal Employees (Curtiss, 1990, p. v).
3 1Novik, 1983; "What is AIPAC?", 1992.
88
funds, AIPAC money would undoubtedly influence these all-
important races as well. Nevertheless, according to The
World Almanac of US Politics, "candidates have become so
dependent on PAC money that they actually visit PAC offices
and all but demand contributions."02
But AIPAC does not merely limit itself to influ-
encing election campaigns. For instance, in order to build
local, non-Jewish support, AIPAC places great emphasis on
establishing grassroots organizations in places where there
are no large Jewish communities. And its nationwide politi-
cal network and key contacts with senators and congressmen
play an essential role in complementing th- work of the
Washington staff. Furthermore, AIPAC uses the media to
"educate the American public on the need for a strong US-
Israel relationship," and it also has student liaisons on
over 175 college campuses to combat anti-Israeli propa-
ganda 33-- a practice Tivnan describes as crushing to
academic freedom and debate. Indeed, AIPAC routinely
coaches students on the correct way of handling "anyone who
might disagree with the AIPAC line," and through its
Political Leadership Development Program, AIPAC trains
3 2Wagman, 1991, p. 30.
"3"What is AIPAC?", 1992.
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students "in the fine art of increasing pro-Israel attitudes
on campus. " 34
2. Unique Lobby/PAC Practices
The practices of the pro-Israel lobby and its
subordinate PACs are different from other PACs in several
ways. First, AIPAC has been able to circumvent federal laws
which limit PAC contributions to $5,000 per candidate per
election (i.e., $5,000 for the primary, and $5,000 for the
general election each year). And with over a hundred
like-minded PACs under AIPAC direction36 , it has thus been
able to contribute 10-20 times over the limit prescribed by
law. The result is that AIPAC is able to exert considerable
political influence through congressional campaign contribu-
tions. "
34Tivnan, 1987, pp. 184-185.
35Curtiss, 1990, pp. v-vii.
36AIPAC does not acknowledge that it has any control or
direction over the pro-Israel PACs, although there is an
overlap of staff between AIPAC and pro-Israel PACs.
Curtiss, 1990, p. xiii. AIPAC's relationship with pro-
Israel PACs was publicized in October 1968 when two internal
AIPAC memos involving political campaign activities were
aired on the CBS television program "60 Minutes" and other
news shows. Grove, 1991.
37Andrew Kilgore and six other former US government
officials submitted a complaint to the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) against AIPAC and 27 pro-Israel PACs in
January 1988 for violating Federal campaign spending
limitations by orchestrating its donations. In December
1990, the FEC ruled that there was 'insufficient evidence'
to support the charge (Grove, 1991). When I asked former
Representative Paul McClosky, Jr., about this ruling, he
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The pro-Israel PACs are also dissimilar from other
PACs because they are virtually unopposed, whereas most
corporate and professional PACs are countered by consumer
and public interest groups. In fact, AIPAC outspent "the
combined forces of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans 145
to 1 in the 1988 elections." 38 And unlike other PACs,
which identify their sponsors or purpose in their title, 118
of the 124 pro-Israel PACs prefer to keep a low profile by
failing to mention the Middle East, Israel, Judaism or
Zionism in their official titles.
3. AIPAC's Power Base
AIPAC success is derived from several sources.
First, Israel's security has been, and remains, a vital
interest for the US. As a result, many of AIPAC's objec-
tives have been congruent with the perceptions of US elites.
While it is beyond the scope of this work to determine
whether these perceptions are a result of AIPAC's exhaustive
work in consolidating the US-Israel relationship, the
rationale for US support is, nevertheless, based on a common
political ideology and a unique moral commitment.
AIPAC's power has also been partly derived from its
past ability to capitalize on America's preoccupation with
responded it reflected the political bias of the FEC (asked
after his opening remarks to the West Coast Model League of
Arab States, 27 February 1992, Mills College, CA).
38Curtiss, 1990, p. vi.
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the Cold War by presenting Israel as a strategic ally
against Soviet expansion in the Middle East. 3 9 This
success was (and is) a direct result of the increasing role
of Congress in formulating foreign policy and the suscepti-
bility of congressmen to PAC funds because of the high daily
cost of maintaining elected office. 4" In managing this
effort, AIPAC usually directs its contributions toward
influential members on committees and subcommittees who
oversee aid or programs affecting Israel.
Some measure of AIPAC's success is reflected in the
1983-84 congressional elections in which six of the top nine
recipients of AIPAC contributions were successfully elected
to the Senate while 14 of the top 15 House recipients also
won. 41
AIPAC has not only used campaign contributions to
influence election results, but it has also withdrawn funds
39President Reagan's perception of Arab-Israeli
problems in terms of the East-West conflict lent further
importance to Israel because he perceived it as a strategic
asset in countering Soviet expansion in the Middle East.
Recently, President Bush reaffirmed America's commitment to
Israel in National Security Strategy (1991, p. 10).
"
4
°According to figures presented by Dr. David
Winterford, a professor of international relations at the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, campaign costs
for Senate elections are approximately $10,000 per day for
each day in office. So, for a one year term, campaign costs
should be projected at $3,650,000.00 (NS 3035 lecture, 26
November 1991).
"
4 1Rubenberg, 1986, pp. 370, 371.
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from senators who have occasioned to vote against the AIPAC
line. Moreover, it often targets congressmen for defeat by
contributing money to the opponent. The fate of Illinois
Senator Charles Percy42 has been referred to in Washington
circles as the "Percy factor," a code phrase that "keeps
members . . . from breaking ranks when AIPAC calls for their
support.",43 Tom Dine, head of AIPAC, told a Jewish
audience after Percy's defeat, ". . . those who hold public
positions now, and those who aspire, got the message.",44
Another element of domestic political support for
AIPAC has been the American public itself, whose backing
stems from a variety of factors, not least of which is a
moral commitment to ensure Israel's survival.
42 "AIPAC decided that Percy was too dangerous in his
role as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee"
because of his votes concerning the AWACS sales and his
insistence on "hearing a variety of viewpoints at committee
hearings"; i.e., concern for Palestinian interests (Curtiss,
1990, p. 58). In 1984, pro-Israel stealth-PACs combined
against Percy by "contributing heavily to his opponent,"
Democrat Paul Simon (giving him over $300,000). Also,
"thousands of Jews from all over the nation . . . donated a
total of $3 million to Simon's campaign--40 percent of his
total funds." Additionally, Michael Goland, a California
businessman, reportedly spent more than $1 million in anti-
Percy advertising. Supporters of Percy filed a complaint
with the FEC charging that Goland was acting on behalf of
Morris Amitay, ex-president of AIPAC and a supporter of
Percy's opponent (Tivnan, 1987, p. 191). Four years later,
Goland was fined $5,000 by the FEC for concealing that he
was a source of some of the advertising funds against Percy
(Curtiss, 1990, p. 59).
"
43Curtiss, 1990, p. 59.
"4 Dine quoted in Tivnan (1987, pp. 190-191).
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AIPAC has demonstrated a keen ability to nurture
public sympathy for Israel which steins in part from American
unfamiliarity with, or hostility toward, Arab nations.
Contributing to this favorable American opinion is a shared
Judeo-Christian heritage, as fundamentalist evangelicals
believe the world as a whole will be blessed through the
state of Israel (if not an expansion into a greater Israel)
because it signals the fulfillment of biblical prophecy--the
return of the Messiah. As a result, the evangelicals
support a pro-Israeli policy and appear to use congressional
politics toward this end. 4"
American Christian Zionists, as they are sometimes
called, represent tens of millions of people and are a
substantial base of support for AIPAC. In an effort to
enhance this interface, AIPAC hired a former legislative
aide with ties to the fundamentalists as part of its
permanent staff. AIPAC has also sponsored prayer breakfasts
in its Capitol Hill branch offices, featuring such funda-
mentalist leaders as Jimmy Swaggert and Pat Robertson as
they break bread with local rabbis. Prime Minister Begin
solidified the relationship with the evangelicals when he
awarded Jerry Falwell the prestigious Jahotinsky Award for
service to Israel."
"45Schultz, 1979, pp. 44, 83-85.
"46Tivnan, 1987, pp. 181-182.
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Due to the influx of European Jews to the US and
Israel (over six million Jews currently live in the US4 '),
there also seems to be a c "cural affinity between the two
countries. Ostensibly, sympathies for Israel among the
general public h~ve been consistently higher than sympathies
for Arab na.'. ns, as measured in various polls from 1947 to
1984. As recently as 1990, for example, Israel was per-
ceived by most people as being a vital US interest. And
between 1975 and 1982 public opinion polls showed a consist-
ent trend that indicated a majority of Americans viewed
Israelis as being modern, democratic, friendly, reasonable,
persecuted, and exploited. Arabs, on the other hand, were
perceived as being warlike, bloodthirsty, backward,
strangely dressed, and arrogant. The recent spate of
terrorist bombings in the US by members of Muslim radical
groups, beginning with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center in New York, have only increased and perhaps
justified anti-Arab, anti-Muslim sentiment. US public
opinion is also shaped by the views of American political
leaders whose favorable ratings toward Israel have been
"
47About 6.5 million Jews live in the US (2.7 percent of
the US population) compared to about 4.5 million Muslims
(1.7 percent) (1991 Britannica Book of the Year, 1991, p.
725).
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consistently higher on opinion polls than the public at
large. 48
4. Implications
According to Tivnan, the effect of US domestic
politics is that US Middle East foreign policy is a
"propaganda" event. The preoccupation of American policy
makers with public opinion, the media, and the political
lobby was seen by British analyst, Peter Mansfield, as the
major weakness in the formulation of foreign policy in the
US. Or as one BBC radio announcer said: "Instead of acting
in terms of actual options and constraints . . . successive
administrations have usually based their positions on what
they think the public/media/lobbies would prefer and
consider reasonable. '49
In short, the implication of domestic politics is
that US interests seem to be subordinated to Israel, and it
is a situation that begs the question, What has "happened to
the debate and analysis so necessary to a genuine Middle
East policy?I'sC
But even if it were true that American presidents
are less influenced than congressmen by the pro-Israel
"
48Gilboa, 1987, pp. 32, 49, 298-300, 306-307; 310-311,
316-317; Rielly, 1991.
49BBC radio broadcast in summer of 1983, cited in
Ismael (1986).
5OTivnan, 1987, p. 161.
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lobby, close political ties have nevertheless existed
between Zionists and presidential administrations. This
began with President Woodrow Wilson's friendship with Louis
Dembitz Brandeis, who headed the American Zionist movement
from 1914-1918 and who was appointed by Wilson to the
Supreme Court in 1916. The Zionist idea of a homeland for
Jews coincided with Wilson's belief in the importance of
self-determination.
Truman, on the other hand, had several close Jewish
associates, particularly David K. Niles, a former aide to
Roosevelt. Sachar in The Redemption of the Unwanted (1983)
indicated that Truman "gave no speech or authorized any
document on the issue of Palestine or the Displaced Persons
without Niles' counsel."''
Subsequent administrations, too, have continued to
pursue Jewish support and maintain a strong US-Israel
relationship. Kennedy, for one, actively sought the Jewish
vote in 19E852 and received funds from such Jewish support-
ers as Abraham Feinberg, a Jewish banker who was considered
by Stephen Isaacs, in his book Jews and American Politics
(1987) "as [being] the first Jewish fund raiser for national
5 1Ibid., pp. 26-27.
1 2When Kennedy asked Philip Klutznick, a wealthy
Chicago real estate developer and president of B'nai B'rith,
what the Jews wanted, he tola Kennedy that Eisenhower on the
Suez was unsatisfactory while Truman in 1948 was on the mark
(Tivnan, 1987, p. 53).
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politics." 5 3 Cheryl Ri•ernberg states that Kennedy also
"initiated the concept of a special relationship with Israel
and began the policzy zTi supplying the Jewish state with
sophisticated Ameritan weapons." 5 4
Furthermore,, dring the Nixon and Ford administra-
tions, Henry Kissingem an American Jew with high sympathies
for Israel's needs. wama appointed first, as the national
security advisor and subsequently, as the secretary of
state. Of course, rxr also emphasized his American
commitment to Israel ziing his presidential campaign"
while, still later,, Reagan regarded Israel as a strategic
asset during the Cold -ar. Most recently, President Bill
Clinton has been vwry c.ear on his unwavering support for
Israel and has appoxinted Martin Indyk, a respected Mideast
53Feinberg was a nmjor backer of Kennedy and had, also
raised money for T-rumam (Tivnan, 1987, p. 55).
54Such arms tran-sfes began with the sale of HAWK
(Homing All the Way) gunIded missile systems in 1962, tanks
in 1964 (under John-scm! and Skyha-vk planes in 1966. "These
sales marked the begimming of Washington's commitment to
assure the absolute regional military superiority of Israel,
which has continued to le a cornerstone of US-Israeli
relations and of American policy in the Middle East."
(Rubenberg, 1986, p. 91Y
55Carter's commitut was based, on his Christian
belief, that a homelamnd for Jews was mandated by God, and on
his political belief,, tat Israel's survival was important
because it was both a democracy and a strategic asset
(Lenczowski, 1990a,, p.. 158).
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analyst and vocal supporter of Israel, to direct Middle East
affairs for the National Security Council.
Indeed, politicians, if they value their careers,
are extremely sensitive to charges of anti-Semitism, and
because of this they have taken pains to avoid suffering any
such accusations, which are often made with little delibera-
tion or forethought. For example, when President Bush
placed a condition on the $10 billion housing loan guarantee
(cessation of new settlements), charges of anti-Semitism
were levied against him by members of the American Jewish
community. Clearly, one result of such fears is that
American foreign policy toward Israel may not be debated as
thoroughly as it should be.
99
V. LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Disparity between what states say and what they
do can create an international credibility gap
of awesome dimensions from the standpoint of
international 1Z2w.
Michael Van Dusen
The constraints faced by the premier International
Government Organization (IGO) operating in the world today,
the UN, may also contribute to the lack of progress toward a
peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is
despite the fact that since the birth of the UN almost half
a century ago the Palestinian problem has been one of that
organization's major concerns. It is at the same time
noteworthy that this preoccupation has stimulated a greater
variety of mission responsibilities than any other world
p.-oblem has to date, and today, tasks like mediation
services, refugee management, and the supervision of
multinational truces have long since been adopted as the UN
modus operandi..
As an international peacekeeping organization, the UN
has a mixed record. On the positive side, the world commun-
ity has so far been spared from a third world war or a
'Brown, 1984, p. 251.
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nuclear conflagration because of its efforts. Conversely,
at least 150 major conflicts nave erupted, 2 with the Arab-
Israeli wars counted among them. And although the UN did
intervene successfully in several of the Middle East
military conflicts, as it did in 1949 and again in 1956, its
capability to impart a permanent, peaceful settlement has
been limited. As will now be shown, these limitations
result from the UN's organizational and juridical
constraints, as well as from the conflicting Arab and
Israeli interpretations of UN resolutions.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
The UN is comprised of representatives from almost 160
nation-states 3 and depends upon the voluntary cooperation
between those states to enhance its organizational effec-
tiveness. However, superpower rivalry during the Cold War
prevented greater international cooperation during that
historic period while UN organizational constraints have
limited the UN's ability to concurrently defuse the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
1. Veto Power
The Security Council and General Assembly have
different levels of authority. Inasmuch as the council is
2Papp, 1991, p. 66.
3As of 1990, 159 states had membership in the General
Assembly (Ibid., 64).
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empowered under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take
legally binding actions when international order and stab-
ility are threatened, the assembly makes decisions of a
recommendatory nature. 4 Consequently, Security Council
resolutions require the unanimous consent of all five
permanent members plus four of the ten nonpermanent
members;' assembly decisions only need majority approval.
In an attempt to bypass the traditional council
gridlock (caused by the all-powerful and frequently-used
veto), the General Assembly in 1950 approved the Uniting for
Peace Resolution, which imparted residual authority to the
assembly whenever unanimity rule in the council was
lacking. 6 This option was utilized, for example, when the
Security Council was unable to pass a cease-fire resolution
to stop the Suez War of 1956.7 In too many instances,
4Ibid., p. 64; Lande, 1967, pp. 356, 227.
'The permanent members of the Security Council are the
victors of WWII (China, France, Great Britain, the United
States and Russia). The nonpermanent members are elected by
the General Assembly to two-year terms. Collective security
measures approved by the council become legally binding on
UN member states without further consultation from other UN
members. (Papp, 1991, p. C1; Lande, 1967, p. 356)
6Halderman, 1969, p. 95.
'Israeli forces invaded Egypt on 29 October. An
emergency session of the Security Council was held on 30
October, but was unable to agree on an American and Soviet
resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire between
Israeli and Egyptian forces due to French and British
vetoes. The case was transferred to the Assembly where,
without the hindrance of unanimity rule, the resolution wa3
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however, the assembly has demonstrated a reluctance to wield
this authority. 8
Traditionally, the aforementioned veto power of
Security Council members effectively constrained the ability
of the UN to respond to, or to defuse the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Take the situation in 1956, for instance, when
individual interests in the Suez Canal caused Great Britain
and France to block the passage of an Egyptian and Israeli
cease-fire resolution. And later that year a similar
political stalemate occurred when the Soviets vetoed a
Security Council resolution calling upon Syria to take
stronger measures to halt fedayeen (Arab or Palestinian)
raids into Israeli territory. 9
Generally speaking, the superpower rivalry of the
Cold War prompted the Soviets to consistently wield their
veto power in the UN to oppose American interests;1 0 and,
passed (Lenczowski, 1990a, p. 532).
8Halderman, 1969, p. 95.
9Israel's security was increasingly threatened by Arab
fedayeen raids launched from Jordan, but primarily from
Syria, in the latter part of 1956. Israel's appeal to the
UN Security Council for intervention prompted six of the
members to propose a resolution calling upon Syria to take
stronger measures to prevent further raids, but it was
vetoed by the Soviet Union (Kortanek, 1978, p. 107).
100n the other hand, American and Soviet leaders had
been in agreement on many Arab-Israeli issues. Both
accepted the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate for
Palestine; both recognized Israel's statehood in 1948, and
both supported the UN cease-fire in 1956, which included the
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indeed, the paucity of UN military or economic actions
against aggressor nations was often attributed to the Soviet
Union, a situation perceived as obstructing the enforcement
mechanism as envisaged in Article 43 of the UN Charter."I
2. Financial Dependency
The UN's dependence cn member states for monetary
support, particularly the US, which is assessed 25 percent
of the UN's annual budget," 2 has at the same time enabled
Washington to assume a preeminent leadership role in UN
affairs. This dependency is most exemplified by the funding
crisis of the 1980's when America withheld financial support
to the UN in protest against growing anti-Western sentiment
during General Assembly meetings."3 As a result, there was
withdrawal of British and French forces and Israel's
evacuation of the territories it had occupied. (Halderman,
1969, pp. 29-30)
"nWright, 1975, p. 357; The UN has engaged in only
three military enforcement activities during its history
(only one during the Cold War). The first occurred in 1950
to repel North Korea's attack on South Korea (Papp, 1991, p.
67). The second instance was in 1990 to oust Iraqi troops
from Kuwait and the third in 1993 to restore internal order
in Somalia. Likewise, economic sanctions have been rare.
In the Arab-Israeli conflict, one of the only instances
where the use of international sanctions was threatened was
in 1956. The threat successfully compelled Israel to
withdraw its forces from the Sinai (Kortanek, 1978, p. 102).
"12US Participation in the UN, 1989.
13The American Congress passed a law in 1985 which
threatened to reduce American funding to the UN by 5. percent
unless the organization changed its rules to permit voting
according to level of financial contribution. The US and UK
withdrew financial support from the UN Educational,
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a marked reduction in anti-American viewpoints and only then
did America resume its financial support in 1988 and, thus,
its control of the international body.14
Indeed, any organization such as the UN, which is
dependent upon member financing and manpower support, will
always be hard-pressed to implement its resolutions. And
America, as the largest single-nation contributor to the
UN--both financially, and in manning military enforcement
activities" 5 -- is integral to most major UN undertakings.
Naturally, those resolutions that were antithetical to
American interests were never pursued.
To put this all into a Middle East context, domestic
US politics, coupled with a foreign policy aimed at Soviet
containment, generated a pro-Israel, anti-communist politi-
cal orientation, which was then directly translated into
American support of Israel, particularly when Israel's
adversaries (e.g., Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) were supported by
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1986,
leading to a revenue loss of 29.6 percent from an annual
budget of $382 million (25 percent provided by US and 4.6
percent by UK). The US also deliberately fell behind in UN
payments in 1987 so that by the end of 1990 over $500
million was owed (Papp, 1991, pp. 76-77).
14By September 1988, the Reagan administration
announced the US would restore its full level of funding.
(Ibid.)
"
15As was previously mentioned, the UN has engaged in
only three military enforcement activities during its
history, and in each instance, the US supplied most of the
troops and a large share of the finances.
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the Soviet Union. As a result, American dominance of the UN
effectively allowed the US to constrain the ability of that
body to effectively moderate the Arab-Israeli conflict, even
when the Soviet Union itself was not blocking peace making
efforts. This was in spite of American rhetorical support
for UN resolutions that called for Israel's military with-
drawal from the occupied territories, the right of return of
Palestinians, or other resolutions legitimizing Arab
demands. Without American support, economic sanctions or
military actions against any of the involved parties were
almost never undertaken while, furthermore, Washington
continuously sought avenues outside the UN from which to
mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict--avenues that generally
coincided with Israeli demands. The current Middle East
peace talks are no exception.
B. JURIDICAL CONSTRAINTS
Besides the aforementioned organizational constraints,
juridical constraints further impede the UN's ability to
effectively function as a peacekeeping organization. Such
constraints result from problems of international law, spec-
ifically, the prominence of national sovereignty and the
ambiguous status of UN resolutions.
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1. National Sovereignty
The issue of national sovereignty has been one of
the most pervasive issues facing the UN"S, which by its
nature seeks to delimit the behavior of nation-states.
Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter limits UN authority in
this regard, prohibiting it from intervening "in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state," but it also grants broad powers to the UN to
employ "enforcement measures" when peace is threatened.' 7
Even though states have accepted the obligations of
membership, namely, to "give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes" and to "refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United
Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action,"''
member states have in practice preserved their individual
freedoms of action. As a result, compliance with UN
recommendations, cooperation with UN sanctions, or adherence
to decisions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are
not ensured. Neither can the UN enforce its decisions upon
member countries. 19
16Lande, 1967, p. 355.
17Tompkins, 1972, p. 113.
"
18Article 2(5) of the UN Charter as cited in Tompkins
(1972, p. 112).
'
9Lande, 1967, p. 227; Papp, 1991, p. 65.
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UN sanctions (including peacekeeping operations)
often fail because member states place their own interests
above international law and because sanctions are imple-
mented in a decentralized fashion, permitting noncompliance.
Indeed, such operations require the parties of the conflict,
as well as the world community, to accept UN peacekeeping
actions, though this congruency happens only rarely.
A member state will also be predisposed to reject
the UN's authority if the organization is perceived to be
antagonistic, as was the case for Israel, which increasingly
became outmatched as newly decolonized Afro-Asian and
communist states joined the UN. The resulting solidarity of
the Communist bloc and the Third World with the plight of
the Palestinians, particularly after the Six-Day War, was
soon reflected in General Assembly decisions, which
condemned Israeli aggressions and even led to the Zionism is
Racism Resolution in 1975 (subsequently repealed in 1991).
Underscoring the preeminent role of Israel's national
sovereignty and refusal to comply with UN wishes, Israel
instead opted for direct negotiations with Arab leaders.
The issue of national sovereignty also places the UN
in a difficult position when addressing the problem of
internal colonialism. Internal colonialism occurs when one
of the nationalities within a state attempts to assert its
own nationalism or when a state has removed a nationality
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from territories perceived to be its homeland. The position
of the UN on this matter has been erratic because of a
variety of political, social, economic and military factors.
In other words, problems born of internal colonialism are
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to mitigate.
Because of this, the UN has not yet formally recognized
Palestinian claims for statehood although the PLO has been
granted observer status at UN proceedings.
2. Ambiguity of UN Resolutions
The status of the General Assembly resolutions
remain ambiguous to this day, and it is generally accepted
that they are not legally dispositive texts which create or
take away rights. Instead, they are considered to be
political or moral statements. Indeed, they have become
more important as documents legitimizing the actions or
claims of nation-states rather than as a collective call for
action. 20  Yet, despite their recommendatory nature, they
are selectively enforced. This begs the question, What
factors determine the appropriateness of a resolution for
enforcement?
UN Resolution 181 (1947), a recommendation for the
Plan of Partition and Economic Union in Palestine,
highlights the complexity of this issue and the sketchy UN
position regarding enforcement. As stated earlier, General
2
=Halderman, 1969, p. 66; Papp, 1991, p. 65.
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Assembly resolutions are recommendations, but the UN had
indicated its intention to enforce the plan in the face of
growing Arab violence 2' and despite the fact Arab states
had rejected the recommendation. The implication of
enforcement therefore pitted the power of the UN against
Arab nationalist desires. But when the Security Council
failed to sanction the use of enforcement measures requested
by the Palestine Commission, the Partition Plan collapsed;
this not only tarnished the reputation of the UN, but
questions then resurfaced surrounding the legal status of UN
resolutions.
The rationale given for not enforcing the plan was
eventually embodied in arguments raised by American and
Indian delegates. They contended that, while the UN may be
empowered to use temporary force to maintain international
security, it was not empowered to use force on a permanent
basis to uphold an arrangement unacceptable to the majority
of the population, even if such an arrangement was pursuant
to a recommendation of the General Assembly or Security
Council." In other words, the Security Council could not
21Halderman, 1969, p. 88.
22UN General Assembly Official Record (GAOR), 2(4
Special Session, 1st Comm., p. 64 (1948) and UN Security
Council Official Record (SCOR), 253d meeting, pp. 265-267
(1948) (Halderman, 1969, pp. 82-83).
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compel the Palestinians to comply with a political
arrangement with which they opposed.
C. ARAB AND ISRAELI VIEWS OF UN RESOLUTIONS
Another obstacle limiting the effectiveness of the UN in
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is the unreconciled
problem of conflicting Arab and Israeli interpretations of
UN resolutions. Indeed, General Assembly and Security
Council resolutions have addressed issues ranging from
territorial sovereignty to refugee rights, but they have
been interpreted differently by Arabs and Israelis. The
following will examine some of the more pertinent
differences.
1. Partition Plan
When Britain relinquished its Mandate of Palestine
and called upon the UN to provide for its future government,
Resolution 181 was passed. The resolution designated the
division of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states and the
internationalization of Jerusalem and the holy places,
placing them under UN administration. The plan was
supported by the US, the Soviet Union, and the Zionists
(though Israel was not a member of the UN at that time).23
Arab leaders, on the other hand, maintained that the
Partition Plan violated Article 80 of the Charter, which
23Wright, 1i15, pp. 14-15; Halderman, 1969, pp. 80-81;
Van Dusen, 1975, pp. 38-40.
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specifies that the peoples of Palestine had to consent to
any change in the status of the mandated territory. 24 They
failed by one vote, however, in turning their appeal to the
ICJ 25 and resorted to the familiarity of armed struggle to
alter the terms of the UN resolution.26
As Israel expanded its territorial control after
-949, Arab and Israeli leaders subsequently reversed their
positions on Resolution 181--precisely because their respec-
tive predicaments were now also reversed. After West
24
"Except as may be agreed upon in individual
trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81,
placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and
until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this
Charter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any
manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or
the terms of existing international instruments to which
Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties."
Article 80, section 1, quoted in Wright (1975, p. 16).
"
25Eight questions were submitted to the ICJ for
advisory opinions regarding the interpretations of
commitments, obligations, and responsibilities growing out
of the administration of Palestine under the League of
Nations and the competence of the UN to recommend partition
or trusteeship without the consent of the inhabitants by the
Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question. Seven of the
eight questions were defeated with 25 votes against, 18 for,
and 11 abstentions. The eighth question (defeated by 21 to
20, with 13 abstentions) pertained to "whether the United
Nations or any of its member states, is competent to enforce
or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the
constitution and future government of Palestine, in
particular, any plan of partition which is contrary to the
wishes, or adopted without the consent of, the inhabitants
of Palestine." UN GAOR Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian
Question, Annex 25, pp. 300-301, UN Doc. A/AC.14/32 and Add.
I (1947), (id. 203), cited in Elaraby, (1969, p. 102)
26UN SCOR, Spec. Supp. 2, p. 11, UN Doc. S/676 (1948),
cited in Rosenne (1969, p. 50).
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Jerusalem fell to Israeli hands during the War of Libera-
tion, and then proclaimed as Israel's capital in 1949,
government leaders defended their actions by saying the
Arabs had invalidated the Partition Plan when they attacked
the city. The Arabs, however, countered those arguments
with their own assertions that they were entitled to reject
recommendations of the General Assembly and that Israel's
seizure of West Jerusalem was a violation of Resolution
181.27
Israel's capture of East Jerusalem in 1967 then led
to efforts to rebuild a united Jerusalem and soon, there
were new cries of foul play from the Arabs. In response,
two General Assembly resolutions, adopted without opposition
in July of 1967 (the second of these won by a vote of 100 to
0, with 18 abstentions including the US),28 determined that
the unification of Jerusalem was invalid and, as such, they
called upon Israel to "rescind all measures already taken"
and "to desist" from further actions "which would alter the
status of Jerusalem."' 29
But Israel refused to comply on several grounds,
claiming that: first, Jordan had violated the 1949 armis-
27Van Dusen, 1975, pp. 40-42; Halderman, 1969, p. 86.
28Record of General Assembly Debate, UN Doc. A/PV.
1554, p. 41, cited in Jones (1969, p. 170).
29Van Dusen, 1975, pp. 40-42; Jones, 1969, p. 170.
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tice agreement by refusing to grant Jews access to the
Wailing Wall; second, Jordan was responsible for initiating
the attack on Jerusalem and should therefore accept the
consequences of its defeat; third; since the international
community tolerated Jordan's unilateral control over the
holy places, it could also tolerate Israel's control; 30
fourth, the institution of divisions and barriers would only
sharpen existing tensions and generate discrimination; and
finally, the integration of Jerusalem did not foreclose a
final settlement which would secure appropriate expressions
to the three great religions at a future date. 31
Conversely, the Arabs rejected Israel's civil incor-
poration of Jerusalem into Israel by reiterating earlier
arguments of 1949 that Israel violated the acknowledged rule
of international law, which prohibited an occupying power
from changing the legal and administrative structure in the
occupied territory, and also that Israel violated the prin-
ciple of self-determination, which is a protected right as
described in both the UN Charter and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. 32
30Van Dusen, 1975, pp. 42-50; Jones, 1969, p. 170.
31Exchange of letters between the secretary-general of
the UN and the Israeli foreign minister, 15 July 1967 and 11
September 1967, published in UN Doc. A/6793, pp. 29, 30,
cited in Jones (1969, p. 170).
32UN Doc. A/6793, p. 7, cited in Jones (1969, p. 171).
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2. Occupied Territories
The issue of the occupied territories--acquiring
land by force and trading it for peace--comprises a second
area of unreconciled Arab and Israeli viewpoints, as a
debate is still raging with regards to which side is the
true aggressor.
Israel, for one, has defended its initial expansion
outside the areas of the 1947 Partition Plan and its
successive expansion after 1967 by placing the blame of both
instances of aggression on Arab states. Israelis believe
the Arabs have only themselves to blame for the current
state of affairs, because once they had engaged Israel in a
war, the Arabs effectively relinquished all claim to the
land, as the spoils of war have traditionally been awarded
to the victor.
Arab supporters, on the other hand, contend that the
Israelis are the true aggressors. They recount Zionist
aims, expressed prior to the 1948 war, to gain ultimate
control of Palestine and to transfer the Arab population to
Iraq and surrounding areas."3 They also point to Jewish
massacres at Deir Yassin and attacks on Arab-inhabited
Jaffa34 just weeks before the .'t-It of the 1948 war--
33Tomeh, 1969, pp. 120-121.
34The Zionist attack on Jaffa three weeks prior to the
1948 war, prompted 400,000 Arabs to flee, and further
supported Arab contentions that the origination of Arab
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evidence, they say, of Israel's intention to provoke Arab
retaliation.
Arab contention that Israel had violated Article 2,
paragraph 4 of the UN Charter (by acquiring territory
through forceful measures") was also a substantial
argument. However, the Arab case has been undermined by
their own contradictory stances in other, similar, cases.
For example, in December 1961 the United Arab Republics
(UAR) not only condoned India's use of force to annex
several Portuguese colonies, but they also sponsored a
proposal to justify that force and to declare the colonies
as a constituent threat tc regional peace. 36 In short, the
prior UN voting positions of Arab states, along with the
USSR, helped to undermine a stronger and more effective rule
against the seizure of territory by force (and, hence, the
refugees began even before Arab troops stepped on
Palestinian soil (Tomeh, 1969, p. 122).
"
35
"All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations," the UN Charter as quoted by
Halderman (1969, p. 89).
3 6When India used force to annex several Portuguese
colonies, the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic
defeated a draft UN resolution in the Security Council
calling for the withdrawal of Indian forces (16 UN SCOR, 988
meeting, pp. 26-27 (1961)). Moreover, the UAR sponspred
another proposal which declared that the colonies
constituted a threat to international peace, thereby
justifying India's use of force (Ibid.).
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principle of self-determination), which they claimed Israel
had violated.
Arabs and Israelis have also held differing inter-
pretations of UN Security Council Resolution 242. For while
the resolution was accepted by all council members and Arab
states bordering Israel (except Syria, and only with serious
qualifications by Israel)," it has not been effective in
reversing Israel's occupation policies, and likewise it has
not precluded Israel's subsequent annexation of East
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
Ze'ev Begin, a member of the Likud party elected to
the Knesset, has written on this subject and his views
illustrate the Israeli consensus. Begin believes that
differing interpretations of Resolution 242 underscore the
need for face-to-face negotiations and that the narrow
interpretation of 242 as a land-for-peace resolution signi-
fies an unacceptable precondition that invalidates the
negotiating process. He maintains that Arabs have erron-
eously interpreted the resolution to imply that Palestinians
have the right to self-determination, that "territories
occupied" does not equate to territories "on all fronts,"
and also that the desired withdrawal of Israel's armed
3
"Wright, 1975, p. 18.
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forces does not imply a withdrawal of Israel's admini-
stration or "any other aspect of its sovereignty.038
Shabtai Rosenne, former ambassador and deputy
permanent representative of Israel to the UN, adds, the
withdrawal of Israel's military forces does not imply a
corresponding advance of armed forces from an Arab state,
nor does it determine territorial sovereignty over the
occupied areas. In confirming this viewpoint, Eugene V.
Rostow, who helped draft Resolution 242 when he served as
the American undersecretary of state for political affairs
in 1967, is reputed to have considered Israel's return of
the Sinai in 1982--an area constituting over 90 percent of
the occupied territories--to have essentially satisfied the
intent of the resolution, even if Israel returned all or
none of the West Bank to Jordan. 39
In sum, the Israelis regard the general objective of
securing a "just and lasting peace",40 to be the most
important facet of the resolution with details to be
"
3 8Begin, 1991, pp. 25-26.
3 9Rosenne, 1969, p. 61; Metz, 1990, p. 73; Begin, 1991,
p. 25.
4
°Resolution 242 is the first resolution to call for a
"just and lasting peace" after a long history of earlier
resolutions which omitted that phrase. Because of the
political implications involved with the word peace, the
Arab states and their friends in the UN were able to obtain
the voting strength needed to virtually omit that phrase in
earlier UN decisions (Rosenne, 1969, p. 57).
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resolved during the negotiation process, 4" while the Arabs
view Resolution 242 as a plan of implementation for
Palestinian autonomy.
3. Refugee Issue
The issue of the Palestinian refugees comprises a
third area of positional ambiguity between Arabs and
Israelis. As complex a problem as perhaps any other involv-
ing Jews and Arabs, there still exists basic, unresolved
issues that pertain to such matters as the actual number of
Arab refugees displaced because of the conflict, the onus of
responsibility for those refugees, and the right of return
and compensation for all affected people.
First of all, successive waves of refugees42 have
made it difficult for both sides to agree on the numbers of
people actually displaced because of the Middle East con-
flict. Nevertheless, they are indeed many, and a good-faith
estimate based on UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) figures
is herewith provided.
The first of the Palestinians refugees emerged in
1947 and 1948 when they escaped during the turmoil of
Israel's birth as a nation-state. Comprising almost
1,500,000 people, they are generally known as the old
41Begin, 1991, p. 25.
42Van Dusen, 1975, p. 61; Tomeh, 1969, pp. 110-111.
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refugees. The generation born to the old refugees after May
of 1948 are also considered refugees.
A second category, the intermediate refugees,
includes over 11,000 Arab inhabitants of the demilitarized
zones between Israel and neighboring Arab states, who were
expelled from Israel after July 1, 1952. Lastly, the
234,000 Arab victims of the 1967 war originally from Jordan,
Syria and the Sinai Peninsula are known as the new refugees.
Together with about 100,000 of the old refugees, menti3rn i
above, they fled even further away from Israel when their
camps were overrun by the Israeli army during the initial
moments of the Six-Day War. According to George Tomeh,
permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the
United Nations, their numbers increase daily as a result of
Israeli actions to "empty the Arab lands of their Arab
inhabitants.,"43
As was mentioned earlier, the Israelis and Arabs
blame each other for the refugee situation. From Israel's
point of view, the Palestinians became refugees only because
they complied with Arab promulgations to leave their homes
and join the United Arab Army in its quest to liberate
Palestine. But this claim is disputed by Arab leaders who
argue that, not only were the Palestinians asked to remain
in their villages, but those who did leave were forced to do
43Tomeh, 1969, p. 111.
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so in the face of Jewish terrorist raids in areas that were
strategically or demographically important to Israel."
What is more, the refugee problem, from the Arab perspec-
tive, is simply a result of the establishment and recogni-
tion of the state of Israel on Palestinian land, and
therefore the UN and Israel are the ones who are wholly
responsible for the refugee problem.
That most Arab states do not grant citizenship
rights to Palestinians residing within their national
borders4" exacerbates the refugee situation even while it
propagates the Middle East conflict into the future. Dr.
Abdel Salam Majali, head of the Jordanian peace delegation,
predicted Arab statesmen would undoubtedly continue this
practice should the Middle East peace talks fail because
such a measure is advantageous to the Palestinian crusade.
He also remarked that when Jordan granted citizenship rights
"44Van Dusen, 1975, p. 58; Tomeh, 1969, p. 121.
"
45The Palestinians acquired a melange of legal statuses
in a number of Arab countries after the British mandate
ended in 1948. Jordan granted them citizenship in 1950,
which included Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip. Other
Arab states granted a combination of full or partial
citizenship on a selective basis while elsewhere
Palestinians are regarded as resident aliens. (Amos, 1988,
p. 368)
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to Palestinians in 1950, the country was attacked by Pales-
tinians who believed Jordan had betrayed their cause. 46
Another tactic for keeping the Palestinian problem
in the forefront has been through the perpetuation of
refugee camps. Palestinian leaders have steadfastly refused
to let their people escape from the squalor of the camps to
resettle into new, modern housing. 4" By denying the
integration of their people into existing states and
communities, Palestinians hope to apply pressure on Israel;
essentially, they refuse to heal the wounds of conflict and
suffering until their goal of statehood is achieved.
For the Arabs, the Palestinian issue embodies both
the right of self-determination (based on natural law) and
the right of return (based on UN General Assembly Resolution
194 (II), December 11, 1948). The former, however, is
regarded by Israel as an Arab attempt to rationalize their
refusal to cooperate with resettlement efforts of Palestin-
ian refugees while the latter is considered an attempt to
win international support for planting a Trojan horse in
Israel's midst. Israel also questions Arab since:riLy cn thz
issue of self-determination because it was they, not the
Zionists, who -ejected the partition plan providing for an
"
46Discussion with Dr. Abdel Salam Majali following his
briefing to the Monterey Chapter of the World Affairs
Council, Monterey, CA, 12 September 1992.
4 7Shipler, 1987, p. 55.
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Arab state for Palestinians, and likewise, when Lhe West
Bank and Gaza Strip were under Jordanian and Egyptian
control, respectively, the issue of self-determination never
arose. 48
What further haunts the Arab cause and undermines
the strength of their position is their perceived hypocriti-
cal voting pattern regarding the issue of self-determination
in cases heard before the General Assembly. Both the Indian
case cited earlier, and the West Irian case, in which Indo-
nesia threatened the use of force to take over areas of
disputed territory, are examples.
With regards to West Irian, a proposed General
Assembly resolution to resolve the matter peacefully and to
recognize the principle of self-determination failed to
achieve the two-thirds vote necessary for passage, with the
UAR, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and the USSR voting
against the resolution. 4 9
But whatever Israel may think, t-e right of return
for those Palestinians who left their homes during the
turbulent period of 1947-48 is indeed contained in UN
Resolution 194 (1948), which says in part, "The refugees
wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with
48Rosenne, 1969, pp. 51, 65; discussion with Dr. Ralph
Magnus, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1992.
49UN GAOR 873, 875 (1961), cited in Halderman (1969, p.
90).
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their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
possible date.""0 Resolution 194 also affirms their right
to compensation if they choose not to return, as well as
compensation for loss of, or damage to property.- Not
surprisingly, though, there is a bilateral failure to
correctly define such questions as, Who determines which
refugees will live at peace with their neighbors? And how
will they be compensated?
Nevertheless, these seem to be moot questions, as
Israeli leaders have traditionally refrained from agreeing
on a settlement of the refugee problem (through repatria-
tion, compensation or resettlement) except as part of a
final peace treaty with international guarantees for
Israel's security. In fact, they employ Resolution 242 only
to justify their approach that the refugee problem should be
placed in the overall political context of the conflict
within which a solution must be designed. Conversely, Arab
leaders have decided to resolve the refugee problem as an
initial step because they do not believe peace is possible
until that is accomplished.S2
5 0Quoted by Haberman (1992).
s1UN GAOR, Resolutions, pp. 21, 24 (1948) (Tomeh, 1969,
p. 118).
5 2Van Dusen, 1975, p. 59; Rosenne, 1969, p. 66.
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But even though Israel has permitted the return of
some Palestinians (it offered to allow 7,000 Arabs to return
in December, 1968)11, it is doubtful that it will support
the return of 2.6 million Arab refugees to an already
crowded and turbulent land; for to do so would present grave
security"4 and economic problems for Israel's 4.1 million
Jews and would quite possibly destroy the very ideological
foundation of the Zionist state.
The matter of compensation is an equally difficult
matter to resolve, especially when both sides view the other
from across a wide rift of disagreement. Although Israel
may not directly contest the issue of compensation, it has
added a number of caveats to the Arab demand that the prin-
ciples of repatriation and compensation be based on the
solutions presented by the Institute of Jewish Affairs of
the World Jewish Congress for German roparations after WWII.
Israel insists that: compensation would be offset by the
continuing economic effects of the Arab boycott;
compensation would be further offset by the compensation
owed to Jewish refugees who were forced to abandon their
properties in Arab countries to find safety in Israel;
compensation would be comprised of a lump sum releasing
"
53Israel's offer was derided by the Arabs as a mere
token (Van Dusen, 1975, p. 62).
54 Haberman, 1992; Van Dusen, 1975, pp. 59-60.
125
Israel from all individual claims; the amount compensated
would be part of a final peace settlement and thus subject
to negotiation; and, international financial assistance
would be required. Essentially, it seems that Israel is
inclined to dismiss the issue of compensation, and prefers
to view the Arab refugee problem more along the lines of a
population exchange."
5 5Rosenne, 1969, pp. 67; Tomeh, 1969, p. 118; Van
Dusen, 1975, p. 60.
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VI. INCENTIVES FOR PEACE
There is a need for a settlement. Without it,
there will be wars and bloodshed [and] the
marginalization of the Middle East.
Yehoshafat Harkabi
Were it not for the seriousness of the potential conse-
quences, the constant bickering of the Arab and Israeli
peace delegates over procedural details would seem almost
comical. Indeed, the constant barrage of sniping continues
to delay the difficult process of negotiating over substan-
tive issues regarding Palestinian statehood and a viable
land-for-peace formula. Certainly, such behavior seems
counterproductive, particularly in the case of Israel, which
has been confronted with imminent destruction since its
inception as a state in 1948. Such posturing seems even
more irrational when the incentives for a peaceful solution
are considered. These would include the enhancement of
national and regional security, the redirection of defense
spending into real economic growth, and finally, the
capitalization of an opportunity for regional and world
support after the demise of the Soviet threat and the
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simultaneous rise of an unprecedented US-European-Arab
alliance after the 1990 Gulf War.
A. NATIONAL SECURITY AND REGIONAL STABILITY
Perhaps the most compelling reason for a Middle East
settlement is the preclusion of another Arab-Israeli war.
There are those within Israel who, echoing the warnings of
Zionists Martin Bube and Judah Magnes at the beginning of
the twentieth century', urge their leaders to choose a
"Zionism of quality, not of acreage.", 2 The assumption of
course, is that the extent of Israel's settlement activity
is not irreversible, in contrast to Benvenisti's asses-
sment. 3 At the same time, more and more Arab leaders are
calling upon fellow statesmen to make a historic compromise
even as Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan acknowledges, "No
problem that has endured as long, has cost as many lives,
has engendered as much distrust, hatred, and discord as the
Arab-Israeli conflict can have a cost-free solution.",4
11uber, 1983, pp. 220-223; Magnes, 1972, pp. 441-449.
2 Harkabi, 1987.
3Meron Benvenisti's argument of irreversibility has
been disproved by history, case in point being the 1,000,000
Frenchmen who left Algeria after 130 years of occupation
(Ibid.).
4 Hassan quoted in Talal (1990).
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But without a diplomatic settlement, the next Arab-
Israeli conflagration is likely to be total war, "not only
in the sense of everybody being a prospective participant
but also in the sense of everybody being a prospective
victim."'5 Iraq's missile launches against Israeli popula-
tion centers, and the subsequent engagement of Israel's
people during chemical attack alerts are vivid reminders of
what could happen if another war were allowed to once more
spiral out of control. Indeed, the proliferation of
advanced arms, ballistic missiles, and unconventional
weapons within the small geographic area of the Middle East,
coupled with Israel's loss of its nuclear monopoly to
Pakistan since the mid-1980s, 6 and perhaps to Iran in
19927, raises not just the fear of war, but now, the
specter of Armageddor. 8
sMorganthau, 1985, p. 399.
6SIPRI 1991 YEARBOOK, 1991, pp. 324-343; Goldblatt and
Lomas, 1987.
7Possible Iranian purchase of tactical nuclear warheads
from the Central Asian republics in early 1992 and reports
Iran was seeking nuclear weapons technology from China in
the fall of 1991 led to a week-long International Atomic
Energy inspection, which concluded Iran's nuclear program
was entirely peaceful ("Atom Agency Finds No Threat in
Iran", 1992).
8The final great battle of Armageddon will occur in
northern Israel and extend down the Valley of Jezreel, below
the mountain of Armageddon. The name Armageddon comes from
Har for "mountain" and the ancient city of Megiddo which
overlooks the plain. The area is also known as the Valley
of Jehoshaphat (the valley of God's judgment). According to
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A resolution of the conflict can also immediately serve
to enhance the prestige of its participants. Verily, with
the stroke of a pen Israel could achieve status as a
sovereign nation with de jure borders; 9 it could receive
explicit Arab recognition regarding its existence as a state
and begin to proceed toward regional economic integra-
tion.10 At the same time, the Palestinians would at the
very least shed the yoke of Israeli rule while, for Syria,
the return of all or a portion of the Golan Heights will
surely be considered a political plum.
Jordan, too, would benefit from a Middle East peace as
it would no longer fear another wave of radicalized Pales-
tinian refugees streaming across its borders. Moreover,
Jordan would gain a more equitable water allocation, and
would enjoy a mutual security arrangement with Israel as
their border issues become settled. This is not to mention
that King Hussein, stricken with cancer, would always be
Revelation (16:16), this ancient battle ground will be the
scene of the most devastating military confrontation in
human history (Jeffrey, 1990, p. 147)
9Legally, Israel has no borders beyond those stated in
the 1947 UN resolution; the armistice lines of 1949 and 1967
merely established cease-fire lines (Wright, 1975, pp. 13-
34).
"°Arab economic boycott of Israel has been in effect
since Israel's establishment as a nation in 1948
(Lenczowski, 1990a, p. 809).
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remembered for having left a legacy of peace and hope for
his people and for all the Middle East."
Just as the repercussions of the Arab-Israeli conflict
have so ruefully affected the region and their superpower
patrons, peace, on the other hand, would elevate the
region's sociopolitical, economic, and military stability,
as well as the international status of the external players,
particularly the US. Moreover, with the security of Israel
ensured, America's relations with the Zionist state would
follow a more normalized track as its policies in the region
would become less constrained and more even-handed--a factor
that would in the long-term help to underpin a lasting peace
for all participants.
B. ECONOMIC GROWTH
The end of the Arab-Israeli Cold War would also signal
an opportunity for real economic growth. In Israel and
Syria, for example, about one-third of all current govern-
ment outlays is on defense,12 with Israel's military
expenditures amounting to $3.24 billion in 1991 and Syria's
amounting to $3.10.13 And while foreign military
"
11Harkabi, 1987; "King Hussein Addresses Nation", 1992.
"
2Drysdale and Blake, 1985, pp. 307-308; Drysdale and
Hinnebusch, 1991, p. 45.
"
3Military expenditure figures may include costs for
internal security as well for defense (The Military Balance
1992-1993, p. 219).
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assistance has offset some of those costs, real economic
damage has nevertheless resulted from the collapse of
internal capital formation'4 and the scarcity of foreign
investments because of regional instability.
Capital investments in Israel have also been diverted
from private sectors into the expense of maintaining the
occupation of the territories captured in 1967. Not only
has the government subsidized housing projects designed to
encourage Israeli settlement in the territories, it has
maintained separate infrastructures for Jews and Arabs, and
has absorbed additional defense costs from occupation, which
require an outlay greater than the annual growth rate of the
gross national product (GNP).'s At the same time, Israel
continues to also suffer from the effects of primary and
secondary Arab economic boycotts.' 6
C. THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the crystal-
lization of new regional alliances following Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, the window of opportunity for an Arab-Israeli
peace is currently open. The end of almost five decades of
14Grose, 1985, pp. 67, 70.
'
5Rossant and others, 1991, pp. 48-49; Peretz, 1986,
pp. 61, 75.
16Grose, 1985, pp. 67, '70; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have
recently lifted the secondary economic boycott (Indyk,
1991).
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superpower rivalry has negated the ability of regional
states to exploit that hostility for their own ends and,
once and for all, it has increased the likelihood that Arab
and Israeli concerns can be viewed on their individual
merits. The end of the Cold War has also led to a congru-
ence of American and Russian aims which serve to guide the
behavior of former client states toward political reconcili-
ation. " Undoubtedly, this political global warming has
resulted in America's unchallenged dominance in the region
and also the emergence of better ties with the former
Soviet-backed states, Syria and Iran.
The shifting alliances in the post-Cold War era also
bode well for peace. Syria's participation in the American-
led coalition in Desert Storm "confirmed its desire to move
back into the Arab mainstream,"" 8 and Israel's restraint in
the face of Iraqi missile attacks may have increased its
stature among Arab leaders. Meanwhile, the PLO may have
become more susceptible to American and Saudi political
leverage as it makes amends for backing Saddam Hussein
during the Gulf War. And Jordan's King Hussein is believed
to have a personal motivation to seek peace with Israel
within the time-lines of his terminal illness. A draft
"
17Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 1991, pp. 7-8; Rubenstein,
1991; Indyk, 1991/92b.
"
8Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 1991, p. 8.
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Israeli-Jordanian agreement, published in early November
1992,"9 could, if capitalized upon by other peace
delegates, provide the format for comprehensive peace
between Israel and its neighboring states and between Israel
and the Palestinians. However, the chance for peace would
be lost if representatives take issue with the agreement and
believe it comprises a separate peace treaty.
The US, an integral player of past Arab-Israeli peace
efforts, has taken an active (if not wholehearted) pledge to
initiate these talks and push-start any stalls in return for
Arab support it received during Desert Storm. Additionally,
Saddam Hussein's abuse of the Palestinian issue has prompted
Saudi Arabia to demonstrate its leadership in resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian impasse, noticeably through overt
support of American diplomatic efforts and by undertaking an
unofficial role as co-sponsor of the talks by underwriting
Russia's financial share.2?
Former Secretary of State James Baker's statement that
the gulf coalition provided a "hopeful reminder that Israel
19The agreement seeks "to establish a just and
comprehensive peace between the Arab countries, the
Palestinians, and Israel" based on UN Resolutions 242 and
338. The agreement regarding the agenda of discussion
includes security, refugees, water allocations, natural and
human resources, borders, curtailment of weapons of mass
destruction, tourism and infrastructure. The agreement will
be concluded with a peace treaty between the two countries.
('Inbari, 1992, pp. 3-4)
2 0Indyk, 1991/92b.
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and the Arab states sometimes find common ground"'2 should
not be lost on deaf ears as Arab and Israeli stat-smen
continue to face the difficult task of negotiation.
Inevitably, the window of opportunity will not last long as
other foreign and domestic issues command American
attention. Unless the participants are willing to
capitalize upon this chance tor peace, they may ultimately
contribute to their own marginalization from American and
world interest--a serious consequence when considering the
past diplomatic failures of regional statesmen. 22
2 1Baker, 1991.




The journey of a thousand miles starts with a
single step.
Chinese Proverb
Compelling arguments exist for peace, though they have
not yet been able to offset the opposing and more powerful
forces playing upon the motivations of each of the major
players in the Middle East peace talks. Indeed, unshakable
forces such as the twin pillars of ideology and security
have guided the people of Israel through the inception,
birth, and evolution of their young nation while at the same
time those same dynamics have exacerbated relations with the
indigenous populations of the occupied territories.
The ebb and flow of hostilities continues even to this
day and, in fact, the existence of those hostilities has now
come to be accepted as the normal order of life for an Arab
or a Jew. According to Shipler, conflict has become "corn-
fortable to both sides," perhaps, because in the presence of
conflict, "the definitions are clean."'
But on the positive front, the recent victory of Yitzhak
Rabin and his Labor party has clearly demonstrated an
'Shipler, 1987, p. 77.
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Israeli mandate for peace. With that portentous turn of
events may perhaps come a reciprocal commitment by the
Palestinians to compromise even further, if only to remove
the yoke of Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
This hope aside, the political will to resolve the Arab-
Iszaeli deadlock, nevertheless, seems lacking at present.
On all fronts, the status quo has become entrenched, both
for what it can provide to the players in terms of material
benefits, prestige, and security, and for what it evokes if
it were to be taken away, i.e., the fear of the unknown.
In addition, the ability of regional leaders to effect a
new peace has been further diminished by internal factious-
ness, competing interests or, simply, the lack of a viable
peace plan. Moreover, peace is not in everyone's interest--
witness the recent spates of Israeli border violence being
perpetrated by Islamic guerrillas in an apparent attempt to
scuttle further peace initiatives.
Without a doubt, the territories which fell to Israel
during the 1967 War represent the greatest issue of
contention. Comprising about one-third of Israel's pre-1967
land mass, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem,
and the Gaza Strip are not insignificant to Israel's
geography or strategic interests, and neither have the Arab
countries nor the Palestinians been able to stop Israel's
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annexation of those precious lands. 2 In fact, Arab efforts
to dislodge Israeli claims have more often than not only
contributed to the deeper entrenchment of the Israeli
position.
Nor has the US been able to effect a resolution. While
political willpower remains a determining factor in the
capability of the US to intervene effectively in the Middle
East, perhaps the US offer to help guarantee Israel's
security in return for a withdrawal from the Golan Heights
will be catalyst enough for the Arabs and Israelis to reach
a comprehensive peace agreement.
Arabs and Israelis have suffered decades of war and
conflict. The talks are almost two years old, but there is
not much else to report. Verily, the status quo remains
firmly entrenched.
But is any one cide to blame for the pathetic state of
affairs?
Of course, some say it is the Jews who are at fault; for
their establishment of a Zionist state in a land with a
mixed population of Jews and Arabs; for their regional
provocations and ruthless corrective responses to perceived
and actual Arab hostilities; and for their subsequent
refusal to trade land for peace.
2Metz, 1990, p. xvi.
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Others, howelrer, maintain the fault should be laid upon
the doorstep of the Arabs; for their early rejection of a
two-state solution; for their hateful rhetoric and terrorist
activities aimed at the destruction of Israel; and for the
continued exploitation of the Palestinian issue by
Palestinians and Arabs alike.
As this analysis suggests, though, the answer to the
question of culpability is that there is no clear
instigator. Indeed, the cycle of events in the region is so
completely intertwined now that it is all but impossible to
tell who is reacting to whom, or even, who is shooting at
whom. In fact, one of the few obvious facts regarding the
Middle East situation is that people are dying. Come to




UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242
(22 November 1967)1
The Security Council
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation
in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissability of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting
peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their
acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have
undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2
of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles
requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in
the Middle East which should include the application of both
the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency
and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of every
State in the area and their right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts
of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and
political independence of every State in the area, through
measures including the establishment of demilitarized
zones;
'Taken from Wright (1975, p. 18).
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3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish
and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful
and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions
and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security
Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special




Period of Wanderings (2000 B.C to 1200 B.C.):
2000-1200: Led by Abraham, the Hebraic tribe leaves Babylo-
nia to wander in the land of Canaan. Joseph takes the Jews
to Egypt. Pharaohs enslave them.
1200-1100: Moses leads the Jews out of Egypt. Jews return
to Palestine and conquer the Canaanites.
Period of Independence (1200 B.C to 800 B.C.):
1100-800: Era of Hebrew sovereignty. Palestine divided by
Jews into the North Kingdom (Israel) and the South Kingdom
(Judah).
Assyrian and Babylonian Dominations (800 B.C. to 500 B.C.):
800-700: Israel conquered by Assyrians; its people taken
captive and dispersed.
700-500: Babylonians conquer Judah; deport Jews and destroy
Jerusalem and the Jewish Temple.
Persian Dominance (500 B.C. to 300 B.C.):
500-400: Persians defeat Babylonians; allow Jews to return
to Palestine. Jewish Temple rebuilt.
400-334: Second return of Jews from Babylon under Ezra.
Greco-Roman Period (300 B.C. to A.D. 300):
334-322: Jews come under Grecian influence when Alexander
the Great conquers Palestine. First contact with the West.
300-100: Old Testament translated into Greek. Foundations
for Christianity laid. Palestine repeatedly conquered.
100-1: Palestine conquered by Romans. Jesus Christ born.
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1-100: Christ crucified by Romans. First Jewish uprising
against Roman oppression. Titus destroys Jerusalem and
second Jewish Temple.
100-200: Second and third Jewish rebellions. Bar Kochba
insurrection. Palestine devastated and made off-limits to
Jews. Beginning of the Jewish Diaspora.
200-300: Jews permitted to resettle in Palestine.
Pre-Medieval and Medieval Period (300 to 1800):
300-600: First laws limiting rights of non-Christians.
Papacy established. Jews surrounded by Christianity.
570: Birth of Prophet Muhammad.
500-1100! Masses of Jews forced to convert to Christianity
in Spain. Jews invited to settle in Italy, France, Germany,
England and become Europe's middle class.
632: A series of Moslem dynasties and empires begin in the
Middle East.
1100-1300: Jews flee Rhineland in wake of Crusades. Settle
in liberal Poland. First ritual murders and burning of
Talmud. Jews banished from England.
1300-1500: Jews banished from France (1400), Spain and
Portugal (1500). Persecutions become economically moti-
vated. Jewish commercial interests decline in West and grow
in East.
1500-1700: Jews relegated to ghett• , in Italy, Germany,
Central Europe. Jews settle in Russia. Jews readmitted to
England, Holland, France.
1700-1800: Rise of Hasidism (mystical Judaism). Beginnings
of psychological anti-Semitism.
1800: Haskaleh is born. Enlightenment in Western Europe
sweeps Jews to high posts in literature, finance and
politics. Become members of Europe's elite.
1881: Pogroms begin against Jews in Europe. Russian Jews
initiate large-scale immigration to the US.
1882: First Aliyah to Palestine (23,000 Jews immigrate) and
ends in 1903.
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1894: Conviction of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the
French Army for treason.
1896: Theodor Herzl founds political Zionism.
Arab-Israeli Conflict (1900 to present):
1903: Second Aliyah (40,000 new immigrants) begins,
supported by Zionist Congress, which buys land for settling
immigrants. Beginnings of Labor party. Second Aliyah ends
in 1917.
1915-1916: Hussein-McMahon letters pledging Britain's
support of Arab nationalism in return for Arab help against
the Turks during World War I. Areas designated for postwar
Arab independence were unclear but includes the Arabian
Peninsula (except Aden), the Fertile Crescent of Palestine,
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, excluding those areas of interest
to France.
1917: Balfour Declaration pledges Britain's support of
Zionism through the creation of a homeland for Jews in
Palestine; through the declaration, Britain hopes American
Jews will favor US intervention in WWI on Britain's behalf
and also that Russian Jews will keep Russia in the war.
1918-1923: End of WWI and Moslem Ottoman control over
Palestine and the Middle East. Third Aliyah (84,000 new
immigrants). The Histadrut and the Haganah (forerunner to
the present day Israeli Defense Force) are established.
Britain sets quotas for Jewish immigration into Palestine.
1923 (September): British mandate established in Palestine.
1924-1939: Fourth and Fifth Aliyahs. Comprised of economic
and political refugees from Eastern Europe due to the rise
of nationalism, the Great Depression of 1929, and the rise
of Hitler in Germany.
1936-1939: Palestinian revolt. Arabs demand cessation of
Jewish immigration, end of further land sales to Jews, and
establishment of an Arab national government.
1939 (May): British White Paper released to announce the
end of Britain's commitment to the Balfour Declaration,
curtailment of immigration and land sales. White Paper is
rejected by Jews and Arabs alike. Despite American and
intern Ljonal opposition, Britain continues to enforce the
White Paper.
144
1939-1945: WWII. The Holocaust; Nazis murder 12 million
people--six million of them Jews.
1947: UN General Assembly Resolution 181 passes to
partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. The
Zionist General Council states its willingness to accept
partition; the League of Arab States says it will prevent
implementation.
1948 (March): First clandestine shipment of heavy arms
arrives in Israel from Czechoslovakia. Irgun's massacre of
250 Arab civilians at Dayr Yasin prompts flight of Arab
populations from areas with large Jewish communities.
1948 (May): State of Israel is born. Israel's statehood
recognized by the US and Soviet Union and 53 other nations,
including Britain. Israel is invaded by Arab military
forces from Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and
smaller numbers from Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Israel's
victory brings additional territories under Israeli
sovereignty than was provided for in the 1947 UN partition
plan.
1949: Armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt,
Lebanon, Sryia, and Transjordan. Israel admitted into the
UN.
1950: Establishment of Tripartite Agreement between France,
US and UK to ration weapon sales to Middle East. Ends in
1955, a year after France's defection from the agreement,
with a secret sale of major weapons to Israel.
1953: Passage of the Land Acquisition Law which authorizes
the government of Israel to seize properties not in
possession of its owners or earmarked by Israel for
essential development, settlement or security. This law
affects refugees living outside Israel's territory as well
as Arabs in Israel displaced by the war of 1948.
1950-1955: Violations of armistice boundaries by Israel and
Arab states. Israel attacks Arab villages in Kibya and
Nahhalin in Jordan (1953), Egyptian military headquarters in
the Gaza strip (1955), and Syrian village east of the Sea of
Galilee (1955).
1955: Egypt turns to Soviet bloc in search of arms to
restore balance of military power.
1956: Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal and closure
of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping provokes joint
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Israeli, British and French attack. Concerted US, USSR, and
UN political action forces the countries to withdraw.
1964: Creation of PLO and Palestinian Liberation Army.
1967 (June): Six-Day War. Egypt's removal of the UN
emergency force (which had been stationed on Egyptian-
Israeli border since the conclusion of 1956 war) is viewed
by Israel as an act of aggression. To preempt an Arab
invasion, Israel attacks first and virtually annihilates the
air forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq and also enjoys
decisive land victories on 'l three fronts. Israel
captures the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Golan
Heights, and Gaza strip. Israel annexes East Jerusalem.
1967 (August): Khartoum Summit; heads of Arab states decide
to seek a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict
(rather than a renewed war) based on the principle of the
"three no's": no peace with Israel, no recognition of
Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.
1967 (November): UN Security Council Resolution 242 passes.
General Assembly votes to censure Israel for its annexation
of East Jerusalem.
1967-1968: Initial period of UN resolutions censuring
Israel for its massive reprisal raids, violation of human
rights in the occupied territories, and establishing Jewish
settlements in the occupied territories.
1969-1970: Degeneration of cease-fire on Suez front into
War of Attrition with frequent military raids and air
battles. Failure of UN mediating mission and US proposals
(Johnson Plan and Rogers Plan) to achieve peace on basis of
Resolution 242. Egypt's Anwar Sadat responds positively to
those initiatives; while the Roger's plan does not produce a
Middle East peace, it ends the War of Attrition.
1970-1971: King Hussein ejects PLO forces from Jordan after
a year long military confrontation.
1973: Israel wins Yom Kippur War after Egypt and Syria
launch surprise attack. UN Security Council Resolution 338
passes to decree a cease-fire and calls upon the parties to
immediately implement UN Resolution 242.
1975 (September): Secretary of State Kissinger's "shuttle
diplomacy" achieves the Second Sinai Disengagement between
Israel and Egypt and helps lay the groundwork for the Camp
David Accords.
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1975 (November): UN General Assembly Resolution passes
defining Zionism as racism.
1978 (March): Israel invades southern Lebanon to destroy
fedayeen who outnumber opposing Christian Lebanese militia.
Fedayeen's killing of 34 Israeli citizens in northern Israel
causes the invasion. Israeli forces withdraw in June under
US and UN pressure.
1978 (September): Camp David Accords signed between Egypt
and Israel, encompassing two frameworks; the first between
Israel and Egypt (which was implemented) and the second to
focus on the Gaza strip and West Bank (which was not).
1978 (October): Prime Minister Begin of Israel announces
that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories will
increase, thereby violating President Carter's verbal
understanding that settlements should be halted during a
five-year transition period.
1980: Israel reaffirms annexation of East Jerusalem.
1981: Israel annexes Golan Heights.
1982 (June): Israel invades Lebanon a second time to end
Palestinian attacks on Israeli territory and civilians and
to establish a regime in Lebanon sympathetic to Israel.
This leads to the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon into
other Arab states.
1982 (September): President Reagan's peace plan--to
reaffirm the non-implemented framework of the Camp David
Accords--is rejected by Prime Minister Menachem Begin and
his Likud administration as well as by the PLO and Arab
states.
1987: Intifada begins in the West Bank and Gaza strip.
1988 (July): King Hussein severs Jordan's administrative
and legal ties to the West Bank.
1988 (December): Yasir Arafat addresses a special session
of the UN General Assembly in Geneva. By renouncing
terrorism, acknowledging Israel's right to exist, and
accepting UN Resolutions 242 and 338, Arafat satisfies
American conditions for reversing its thirteen-year policy
of excluding the PLO from official negotiations.
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1991 (April): Ariel Sharon, Minister of Housing under the
Likud administration, announces plans to vigorously expand
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.
1991 (November): Middle East peace talks begin.
1991 (December): UN repeals Zionism resolution.
1992 (June): Labor party wins Knesset elections and ends
Likud's hardline administration and aggressive settlement
policies; Israeli public sends a clear mandate for peace.
1992 (November): Draft Jordanian-Israeli agreement
announced regarding substantive areas for discussion on
security, water allocation, borders and arms control, within
the principles of a comprehensive Middle East peace
settlement.
1993 (June): Tenth round of peace talks are held in
Washington DC.
1993 (July): Israeli air and ground forces bomb South
Lebanon in retaliation for escalated terrorist attacks of
citizens and security forces in border areas. The assault,
termed the worst since the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon,
forces about 400,000 Arabs to evacuate toward Beirut. Prime
Minister Rabin hopes to not only destroy guerrilla
operational bases, but to pressure Lebanon and Syria, its
patron, to control Hizbullah activities. A cease-fire is
arranged by Secretary of State Christopher.
1993 (August): Major figures from the Palestinian
delegation to the peace talks have threatened to quit if
Yasir Arafat continues to control the substance of the
talks. The delegates want to include the issue of East
Jerusalem while Arafat is willing to delay this discussion,
demonstrating PLO alignment with Israel on this matter.
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